# INTRODUCTION

TWO INTERTWINED THEMES DOMINATE the history of the nineteenth century: empire building and modernity. Modern empires derived much power from complex iconographies developed to define and disseminate official images. Among these "invented traditions," to use a memorable term coined by Eric Hobsbawm, public spaces occupied key positions and stood as metaphors for a modern order. They were conceived as stages that exhibited notions of power through permanent symbols; they accommodated public ceremonies; and they served as fields of action, where imperial agendas were played out and where citizens asserted their own voices. Arguing for the existence of a "connected world of empires" in which ideas, strategies, and technology traveled smoothly, this book studies the construction of public space in the French and Ottoman empires.[1] I trace the shaping of a universal imperial iconography through the physical transformations in the built environments, concentrating on infrastructure, street networks, urban squares and parks, and architecture. Situating the two empires in a comparative framework, and with a deep awareness of their unequal status in the nineteenth-century world order, I hope to show a broader picture of the cross-cultural exchanges. To expand conventional associations, I am inspired by Marshall Berman's "broad and open" definition of modernity, which argues for, among other issues, "a dialectical process" across physical and social space to reveal hitherto ignored links.[2]

The choice of my case studies moves the emphasis from the "centers" to the "peripheries." I acknowledge the undeniable significance of the capital cities as primary sites for expressing notions of empire but suggest that, to achieve a comprehensive understanding of imperial constructions, it is even more productive to look at the regions at the "margins" with different historic, social, and cultural characteristics. Imposing the presence of the empire and engraving its image with modern connotations presented heady challenges in these settings, and having to confront the regional specificities led to the adoption of transparent and direct practices. Accordingly, my case studies are drawn from the cities of the Maghrib under French colonial rule and the Ottoman Arab provinces. More specifically, the geographic area includes, in the French case, Algeria and Tunisia (the French domination of Morocco falls outside the chronological boundaries of this study) and, in the Ottoman case, the *vilayets* (provinces) of Syria, Beirut, Aleppo, Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Hijaz, Yemen, and Tripoli (in Libya, hereafter Trablusgarb).[3] I chose not to include Egypt, as its ties to the Ottoman Empire (going back to 1517) became more and more tenuous after Muhammad Ali Pasha acquired a semiautonomous status for the area in 1805, which lasted until the British occupation in 1882. Relying on French and Italian expertise, Muhammad Ali initiated a series of military, economic, and administrative reforms, which were followed by legal, educational, and infrastructural ones under Khedive Ismail Pasha (1863–79), who was granted partial independence from the Ottoman Empire to conduct technical and economic programs with foreign powers. There is no doubt that situating Egypt's modernization in my framework would have raised further questions; however, my focus on empire building calls for its exclusion.

Although I return to Paris and Istanbul (and the communication between them) periodically, my inquiry embodies a web of cross-references among urban centers such as Algiers, Damascus, Constantine, Aleppo, Tunis, Beirut, and Trablusgarb. I cover the major cities of the region to some extent, but without giving them monographical depth—based on the argument that inclusion of a wide spectrum allows for a broader understanding of the making of public spaces and reveals the multiplicity of experiments and the variety of end products. My goal is twofold: to highlight the dominant tendencies and to make a case for specificities.

## SHIFTING CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

The French colonies of North Africa and the Ottoman Arab provinces allow for a meaningful comparative study for several historical reasons, primarily stemming from a shared language (Arabic) and religion (predominantly Muslim) that created a comparable social and cultural structure. Another critical factor is the pre-nineteenth-century history of the entire region, which had been under Ottoman rule since the sixteenth century. Modernization through (French) colonization or (Ottoman)



reform had to be implemented in response to an Ottoman environmental and institutional landscape already in place. A provocative parallel in the domination history of the two regions extends beyond the time bracket of my study: with the establishment of the French mandate after World War I, Syria and Lebanon experienced a similar passage from Ottoman to French rule as Algeria and Tunisia had done in the nineteenth century. This development makes my story of domination and its manifest forms of expression open-ended.

Methodologically, my choice to study these two regions in relation to each other promotes the reconsideration of the conventional bilateral axes of east–west and north–south that continue to dominate scholarly inquiry.[4] By showing a multidirectional communication pattern that dismantles the one-way vector of European influences on Ottoman modernizing reforms and the singular focus on France and the Maghrib during the colonial era, I hope to bring a new understanding to cross-cultural relations.[5] For example, one specific voyage of architectural ideas begins with the Ottoman capital of Istanbul looking to Haussmann's Paris for models of modernity. Right around the same time, in a project by prominent architect Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc, Paris turned to sixteenth-century Ottoman mosques of Istanbul to develop a monument in an *architecture parlante* in Algiers that was deemed suitable to visually summarize power relationships in the colony. Several decades later, elements from Viollet-le-Duc's commemorative design showed up in Damascus (after passing through Istanbul), this time to celebrate the opening of the Damascus–Mecca telegraph line, a symbol of technology in the service of Islam. This passage of ideas charts out an unexpected circulation of influences (see chapter 3).

Comparative history confronts at the outset the difficult issue of depicting the case studies. The role played by Ottomans in nineteenth-century empire building could be examined in relation to the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Japanese, and British empires, each comparison provoking new questions. My focus on the Ottoman and French empires derives from an interest in issues of imperialism and colonialism and awareness of the close intellectual affinities between the Ottomans and the French. Comparative studies of modern empires have concentrated on Western empires (the British and the French are the leading examples), excluding, among others, the Ottoman Empire, which was not deemed to be at the same level of advancement. When the Ottoman Empire entered the broader discourse, attention commonly turned to its responses to European norms and models, with the clear implication that it occupied a lower status in the hierarchy. I argue for a two-way street between the French and Ottoman empires, if not with the same intensity of traffic in each direction. Even when there is no exhaustive textual documentation that maps the cross-cultural dialogues, tracing parallel developments reveals the existence of complex communication patterns, as in the use of urban forms and architecture as political tools.

Engaging in comparative history with only two case studies exposes the enterprise to the trap of bilateral constructions. In my attempt to avoid this, I was aided by the unequal status of the two empires and the source materials for each, conditions that prevented me from suggesting "balanced," "point-to-point" comparisons. Evident in the particular slants taken by the discussions in different parts of the book, this unevenness, which reminds us that history is uneven, emanates also from my decision to highlight certain themes or issues. Hence, for example, the emphasis on the transformations of urban fabrics in Algeria and Tunisia (chapter 2) is due to the wealth of source material, as well as my concern to introduce some of these important cities into the ever-growing discourse of colonial urbanism. The focus on Ottoman "race thinking" (epilogue) stems from the relatively unexplored nature of the topic, as opposed to the extensive literature on its French counterpart. The same reasoning colors other parts of the book: whenever I felt my research was opening new ground, I allowed it to take priority at the expense of evenly constructed exposés.

This study of empire building is from the "official" perspective, that of the French and the Ottoman states and elites. I focus on the vision from "above" of the struggle to control and unite the imperial territories by devising myriad mechanisms. My goal is to display a broad picture that will help develop an overall understanding of the process in both cases and in relation to each other and will underline the presence of multiple imperial modernities. Of course, center-periphery relations amounted to a lot more than that—as articulated by Jens Hanssen in his recent study of Beirut: "Within Ottoman center-periphery relations, imperial inspection and local self-representation merge Foucault's technologies of modern governmentality and epistemological power on the one hand, and the processes of adaptation. negotiation, experimentation, and contestation by those people subject to these imperial practices on the other."[6] I tell only the first part of the story, which is complex, multivalent, and contradictory in itself. The other part, the reception of the modernization projects by the peripheries, remains outside the boundaries of my book but has enjoyed some recent scrutiny, especially by historians of the late Ottoman Empire.[7] I see my book as a complement to their work, one that contributes to the drafting of a canvas on which the adaptations, experimentations, contestations, and negotiations may be cast.

Among the many themes that run through the book, two should be highlighted, as they set the broader parameters to my perspective in studying modern empires: communication and ordering. The different forms of communication, all intertwined, depended on modern technology: cartography, telegraph lines, postal service, rail and land roads, bridges, canals, ports, urban street networks, but also printed media, including periodicals, books, published laws and regulations, and, of course, photography. Linking modern communication's origins to the programs of the post-1789 French state, Armand Mattelart argued that it was a "project of mastering space"—a description that foregrounds its complex role in empire building.[8]



Communication also came to define the standard by which "civilization" was measured. In promoting rail and telegraph lines from the Ottoman Empire to India, William P. Andrew wrote in 1857: "The railway and telegraph are not only of incalculable value as political instruments, but they are the pioneers of enlightenment and advancement: it is theirs to span the gulf which separated barbarism from civilization."[9] The *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIX*e siècle (begun in 1865) reiterated this sentiment: "the freest and most civilized nations . . . are also those that possess the best means of communication."[10] Maps were at the heart of the operation as "a projection of a rational system in which everything should communicate."[11]

Advances in communication technology served as indispensable tools for colonization. For example, the overhead telegraph lines installed in Algiers in 1842 (only five years after the invention of telegraphy) proved to be extremely useful during the colonization of the country.[12] Around the time of the occupation of Algeria, Michel Chevalier, a Saint-Simonian, had envisioned a "Mediterranean system" that would turn the basin into "the nuptial bed of the Orient and the Occident" in the form of a confederation bound together by modern communication. Colonization was essential to the realization of Chevalier's hierarchical utopia, with France at its pinnacle: "By the railway and steamships, and with the help of some other modern discoveries such as the telegraph, it will become easy to govern most of the continents that border the Mediterranean."[13] Chevalier's means of communication could be extended to include regularized urban public spaces, government offices where information was carefully categorized and filed, and the dissemination of ideas, including the power of communication itself, through modern media.

Communication not only was instrumental in empire building and colonization but also linked empires to each other. Consider the part played by telegraphy: without the 1,800 miles of lines that crossed the Asian territories of the Ottoman Empire, Britain could not have been connected to India. The urgency of efficient communication increased in the aftermath of the Indian mutiny in 1857—and explains the keen interest of British enterprises in developing the Ottoman lines.[14] A map of telegraph lines from 1874 shows the Ottomans' own dependence on other countries to reach its overseas provinces, among them Trablusgarb, which could be accessed only via Italy, in addition to the widespread distribution of the lines in the east and west (fig. I.1).

Ordering, documentation, classification, and filing of information, crucial to the controlling apparatus of a modern state, made their lasting mark on imperial space from macro- to microscale. In 1790, with the goal of replacing the former provinces of the Old Regime, characterized by intersecting administrative districts and judicial and religious units, with a unified set of administrative units, the French National Assembly divided France into eighty-three departments, which in turn were divided into districts and communes.[15] Eighty years later, the 1871 Ottoman Law on the General Administration of Provinces (İdare-yi Umumiye-yi Vilayet Nizamnamesi, based




1.1 Map showing telegraph lines in the Ottoman Empire, 1874 (AK).

on an 1864 "vilayet law," or "law of provinces") established administrative divisions and uniform principles of management and reform that would be pursued throughout the empire. Modeled after the Code Napoléon, it reorganized the imperial territories into twenty-seven *vilayet*s (provinces), each governed by a *vali* (governor-general) appointed by the capital. *Vilayet*s were divided into *sancak*s (departments), each



headed by a *mutasarrıf* (governor); then came *kaza*s (districts or *arrondissements*), under *kaymakam*s (undergovernors). The hierarchy continued down to the *karye*s (villages).[16] Upon his appointment as the governor of Syria in the 1870s, Midhat Pasha described the land division system in detail and identified the official administrator at every level, along the way revealing a hierarchical delegation of responsibility that would allow for complete control.[17] The importance placed by Midhat Pasha on this law testified to the urgency felt by the Ottoman state to unite the empire by

means of a shared, transparent administrative system. Speed and efficiency also marked the functioning of the modern state, inserting the element of "time discipline" into the general order. The opening and closing hours of offices, train and tram timetables, and school schedules all contributed to the management of time—the importance of which was proclaimed in public spaces in the form of large clock towers (see chapter 3).

The regularization of administrative and other institutions (e.g., educational ones) meant further transformations to the urban fabrics and cityscapes. The same laws and regulations on the opening of new streets and squares produced comparable modern fragments in dispersed cities of the empire. Government buildings, sheltering the shared modern bureaucracy, dotted the urban centers. The placement of memorial monuments followed similar principles, adding yet another spatial and visual level of uniformity. The mapping and repeating of a legible pattern hence promoted and made concrete the centralized control of the empire over its territories.

As a historian of built form, my approach centers on the physicality of architecture and cities. I analyze buildings, spaces, and spatial relationships, and considering them as social-political documents, I investigate their workings in the history of empire building. I am interested in multiple facets of modernity, cross-cultural communication patterns, the flexibility of the city as a stage for social and cultural transformations, the cohesive dimensions of public spaces to affect behavior patterns, their ability to adapt to new programs and needs, the potential of architecture to carry political messages, and the divergent meanings behind remarkably similar forms. The "tangible substance, the stuff of the city," that is, "the physical mass of marble, bricks, and mortar, steel and concrete, tarmac and rubble, metal conduits and rails," constitute my primary actors and documents.[18] Yet their stories need to be understood, triangulated, and contextualized by interdisciplinary research, borrowing methodologies and technologies from other fields, among them social and political history, art history, geography, and anthropology. Visual culture occupies a particularly important place in this study: photography plays a central role, linking sight, knowledge, and power especially after the mid–nineteenth century, and constructs bridges between the fractured pieces of data from different sources. With the boundaries between disciplines becoming blurrier, empirical research getting more cross-referential, and the material becoming richer but more elusive, the need to negotiate an increasingly complex terrain allows for new methodological experiments.

## THE HISTORIC BACKGROUND: AN OUTLINE

The chronological bracket of this book extends from 1830 to 1914. Two important events of the 1830s were the French occupation of Algeria (1830) and the declaration of the Tanzimat Edict, also known as the Gülhane Edict (Gülhane hatt-ı şerifi, 1839),



by Sultan Abdülmecid, which opened the way to an extensive series of modernization programs known as Tanzimat (literally, "putting in order") reforms in the Ottoman Empire. The beginning of World War I signals the demise of the Ottoman Empire and complete French control of the Maghrib, including Morocco (which had become a protectorate in 1912). To provide a historic survey of this era (even a concise one) is beyond the scope of the current study, but a broad-brush reminder of the developments that are key to the themes of the book should help anchor my arguments to their complex background.

The invasion of Algeria by the French was instigated by the mythical *"coup d'éventail"* of 1827, that is, the dey (*dayı* in Turkish) of Algiers (Hussein Pasha) slapping the French ambassador on the face because of a financial disagreement. France reacted with a maritime blockade and, three years later, military invasion. Rationalized to local people as an operation "to chase the Turks, your tyrants," in order to help them to regain their country, the occupation led to the end of Ottoman rule (established in 1529) and withdrawal of the Ottoman elite to Istanbul. Nevertheless, it proved to be far from a smooth affair. Met by recurrent resistance from the early 1830s on, the French military administration took charge of all affairs of the colony, with the size of the army growing steadily. At the center of resistance was the legendary figure of Emir Abd el-Kader, who built a regular army and confronted the French troops for the first time in 1832 outside Oran. Until his final defeat by French forces in 1847, Abdel Kader fought many battles, which sometimes resulted in negotiations and peace treaties, only to be followed once again by armed conflict. The turbulent history of these years, accompanied by an initial ambivalence on the part of the French about the kind of rule they wanted to establish there, led to experiments that gave some power to Arab leaders in the countryside, while the French held on to Algiers, Oran, and Bône and their environs. However, the insurmountable conflicts always ended up in military confrontations, culminating in a long and often-atrocious war. The mass killings by the French army, including razing villages "to terrorize the tribes" and sending fumes into caves to asphyxiate people taking refuge there, provoked moral questions among the conquerors and raised doubts about the future character of French rule. One official commission was revolted by the violence exerted on local populations: "We have surpassed in barbarism the barbarians we were going to civilize." De Tocqueville agreed with this assessment in his famous 1847 report: "Everywhere, we took control of the revenues [of the *habous*, the religious foundations] by changing their former functions. We reduced the charitable establishments, abandoned the schools, dispersed the seminaries. Around us, lights have been turned off. . . . In short, we have rendered the Muslim society much more miserable, disorderly, ignorant, and barbarian than it had been before it got to know us."[19]

The wavering confidence in the legitimacy of the conquest, the uncertainties about the nature of French rule, and the violence of the era explain much about the urban

and architectural design decisions at the time. Another striking trait of the period was the army's direct involvement in all affairs of the colony—administrative, institutional, infrastructural, architectural, and cultural. Military officers conducted scholarly research on various aspects of Algeria, including its people and popular customs and traditions, documented it visually (with maps and drawings), and engaged in construction activities that transformed its cities. In short, the army was the main conduit of modernity in Algeria. A considerable number of visual and textual primary documents on which this study is based were created by military engineers (see especially chapter 2).

The military regime endured for four decades, with shifting policies toward the administration of the colony and control of the indigenous people. The Second Republic (1848–51) policy of assimilation declared Algeria an integral part of French territory and placed it under metropolitan law, ultimately calling for the abolition of precolonial administrative systems. The act of 9 December 1848 reorganized the colony into three *départments* according to the Code Napoléon (Algiers, Constantine, and Oran), which were further divided into districts (*arrondissements*) and communes—to be administered by prefects, subprefects, and mayors, respectively. This structure separated the military rule from the civilian one to some extent but relegated the territories formerly under the control of local leaders to the military. The creation of a Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies in 1858 affirmed the policy of centralization and emphasized its extension to Muslims, described as "an armed and inveterate nation that must be quenched by assimilation."[20]

In the 1860s, during the reign of Napoléon III (1852–71), a significant change occurred in the policies toward the "indigenous" people. Influenced by Saint-Simonian philosophy, the emperor advocated an association policy that was based on respect for Arab society and that called for its preservation. Declaring Algeria a *royaume arabe,* or Arab kingdom (and not a "colony"), he envisioned it as an extension of France where Arabs and Europeans lived and worked peacefully side by side, with technical expertise from the metropole supporting its development. Muslims would be declared French citizens but allowed to keep their religion; Islamic courts would be reestablished; public instruction would be developed and higher education institutes opened; and the "indigenous battalions" in the French army would be increased. Ch.-Robert Ageron, the prominent historian of Algeria, summarized the philosophy of the *royaume arabe* in three words: protection, reconciliation, and association.[21] Napoléon's initiative revived some of the precolonial educational establishments, for example, by reopening elementary Koranic schools. Nevertheless, by teaching Arabic in the morning and French in the afternoon, it was the "Arab-French" primary schools that truly represented the emperor's vision.

Not helped by a series of natural disasters (including a long drought, followed by a disastrous famine) and opposition from the settlers, Napoléon III's policies soon



were abandoned. However, his short-lived "Arab dream" had important consequences on architectural practices in North Africa. Valorizing Arab society and culture called for a scholarly appreciation of its artistic and architectural productions and cleared the way for their inclusion in the official "heritage" of the colony, next to works of antiquity. Their documentation, restoration, and preservation followed. Eventually, at the turn of the century, architects began integrating "Islamic" fragments into "European" buildings, contributing to the diversity of modernism (see chapter 4).

An insurrection a year after the shift to civilian rule in 1870 expressed the accumulated discontent of Muslims under French rule and their desire to gain independence; it was provoked by the results of the 1870 Prussian War and the regime change, which were deemed to testify to the weakness of the French state. The defeat of the insurgents translated to the victory of the settlers and led to the solidification of *Algérie française.* An official colonization policy invested large sums in the operation while conducting further expropriations—all facilitated by new laws and procedures. The subsequent fifty years witnessed an influx of colonists and the consolidation of the colonial power structure according, in general, to the policies established in the 1870s. Made possible by expropriations and the 1873 Law of the Settlers (revised in 1889), which abolished the holding of property by indigenous "collectives," special privileges granted to immigrants drew them in waves to the countryside. Between 1870 and 1900, settlers obtained three times more land than had been occupied in the previous decades, and the numbers of Europeans in the Algerian countryside increased to one-third of the total European population in Algeria. Urban areas displayed a similar pattern of development, but more intensively, attracting French administrative officers and merchants, as well as other Europeans. The "assimilation" policies continued to erase the precolonial institutions of Algerian society, including the justice and educational systems; the religious structure was also upset by the establishment of an official Muslim clergy—a concept foreign to Islam. The cities (and the countryside) reflected the transitions, absorbing the growing numbers of European residents and accommodating the amenities necessary for their lifestyles, against the background of the diminished presence of precolonial institutions (pl. 1).

During the first fifty years of the time period covered in this book (and since 1574), Tunisia was a province of the Ottoman Empire, with a semiautonomous political structure (*beylik*). According to Tanzimat agendas, the beys, most significantly Ahmed Bey (1837–55) and Muhammad Bey (1855–59), and Prime Minister Khayr al-Din (1873–77), engaged in a series of reforms, beginning with the military and extending to administration, finance, education, and urbanism. Aware of the "European progress in the field of civilization," as Khayr al-Din wrote in his political treatise *The Surest Path* (1867), Tunisia looked to Europe, especially France, but also to Istanbul

for models. Khayr al-Din explained Europe's advancement as based on science, deducing lessons for Tunisia to follow in order to reach the same goals, along the way endorsing the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms: "Europe has attained these ends and progress in the sciences and industries through *tanzimat* based on political justice, by smoothing the roads to wealth, and by extracting treasure of the earth."[22] Describing the "means of civilization" that enabled European countries to "achieve the development they sought," the governmental clerk Ahmad ibn Abi Diyaf highlighted infrastructure projects: steamships that eased "their paths at sea, . . . smooth roads, enabling carriages to reach all places, . . . a postal service to carry the letters that facilitate intercourse, . . . iron roads on which steam-powered carriages can speed," and "the transmission of information by a form of magnetism called the telegraph, which is among the wonders of the world."[23]

Both authors supported the Ottoman reform programs, and Khayr al-Din argued that implementing Tanzimat would ensure "growth and development in the provinces."[24] In 1857, Khayr al-Din played an instrumental role in the promulgation of Ahd al-Aman (the Fundamental Pact), a Tunisian charter based largely on Tanzimat principles. A municipal council was established in Tunis in 1858, only four years after the one in Istanbul. Its responsibilities included maintaining security, drafting and administering a budget, and serving the "public good" by overseeing the public spaces and water and sewage lines. A set of urban regulations, such as one on street cleaning, supported the municipality's tasks.[25] Echoing the initiatives to bring order to cities in the other Arab provinces at the time, the measures taken in Tunis affirmed its ties to the empire, and in all likelihood, they would have been followed by more extensive urban projects.

The French administration pursued a different approach to the colonization of Tunisia than they did in Algeria. The occupation forces in Tunisia in 1881 adapted the municipal institutions already in place in Tunis but employed a more aggressive approach to transforming the rest of the colony. Tunisia was considered, not as part of France, but rather a protectorate that reserved a symbolic sovereignty for the bey, who would have a say in the financial, judiciary, and administrative "reforms" deemed necessary by France. The goal was to append Tunisia to France without any financial burden to the metropole. The colony would thus be "reorganized, without costing the treasury anything." It was "rich enough that it only needed order and justice. Particular enterprises would take care of the rest, under the supervision of the bey, with some French agents and especially [the French] resident-general." Because of the development of French infrastructure projects in Tunisia since the 1840s, this was a predictable attitude. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, the minister of foreign affairs at the time, explained the situation: "Since 1847, we have established [in Tunisia] the postal service; . . . a telegraph service; . . . a railroad from the Algerian border to Tunis." Under the protectorate, the work would continue to bring "the benefits of civilization



that [the French] enjoyed."[26] Historian Abdallah Laroui has argued that Tunisia was not spared the shock of colonial intervention and that the policies privileged economic and legal violence.[27] The differences in the governing of Algeria and Tunisia resonated in the urban landscapes: the massive transportation projects and city building that occurred in Tunisia were consistently geared toward economic goals while continuing to etch the image of the empire. Leaving the existing cities untouched, the practical interventions appended vast patches of European-style settlements and structures to the built fabrics of Tunisia (see chapters 1 and 2).

As the French Empire was expanding, the Ottoman territories were shrinking: Greece gained its independence in 1829, followed by Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro in 1877, in addition to the empire's loss of Algeria and Tunisia to France. In the second half of the nineteenth century, despite the dramatic shift in power to Britain, France, and (after 1870) Germany, the Ottoman Empire continued to play a crucial role, devising strategies of survival in response to the ever-growing pressure from expanding European powers. Its political independence allowed it to develop and pursue its own modernization programs, including cultural modernization—even though defining the notions of Ottoman sovereignty and modernity was a thorny affair in an age of European hegemony, as argued by Ussama Makdisi.[28]

Tanzimat reforms, key to Ottoman rejuvenation programs, marked, not a sharp break with the past, but a critical moment in a process that had started at the end of the eighteenth century. By crystallizing the agendas, they cleared the way for great transformations in the structure of the empire. One of the most important goals was centralization, which meant redefining the relationship between the center and the peripheries—as opposed to the historic decentralized administration, which maintained a distance between the two. In Makdisi's words, "Ottoman reformers sought to nationalize (Ottomanize) the empire and ultimately to absorb the margins into a cohesive and uniform Ottoman modernity."[29] A series of laws and regulations laid out the foundations of the integration of the empire. The 1869 citizenship law, pursuing the Tanzimat notion of political equality, dictated that people living in the empire were no longer subjects (*reaya*) but Ottoman citizens (*taba*). The Provincial Municipality Code (Vilayet Belediye Kanunu) of 1877 complemented the 1871 law on the provinces, mentioned above. It stipulated programs for urban reform that included the opening of new streets, paving, cleaning, and illumination of public spaces, supervision of construction and demolition, and matters related to public health and safety, as well as setting the conditions for forming municipal councils.[30] In short, a series of critical issues needed to be addressed in every province according to general criteria set in Istanbul. Around the turn of the century, İbrahim Pasha summarized the daunting tasks ahead of him as the governor of Trablusgarb: "The official administration must be governed with a severe discipline. . . . A reform program must be put into effect. The police must be reorganized. Education, public works, commerce,

and agriculture must be given new direction. All administration must be regularized and public order maintained. . . . Justice, discipline, [and] order must reign."[31]

Osman Nuri Pasha, the longtime governor of Hijaz and Yemen, listed six areas requiring attention in the provinces: "the establishment of administrative and political divisions," "the construction of government buildings and military establishments which would reflect the glory of the state," the foundation of law courts, "the spread of education and the procurement of progress in the trades and professions," an increase in revenues, and road construction.[32] Unlike the French practice in Algeria, where the army served as the main agent of modernity, the task was shouldered primarily by bureaucrats in the Ottoman Empire.

Scholars have recently begun to question the Tanzimat reforms from a historiographically unprecedented angle: whether the reforms gave birth to an Ottoman "colonialism" of sorts, an inquiry that makes sense given the "imperialist" character of the major nineteenth-century world powers.[33] This context, they argue, led the Ottoman elite to consider the imperial peripheries, and especially the Arab provinces, as "colonies" and to espouse colonialism with modernity (as in the French case).[34] An advanced center hence aimed to reform the backward peripheries. While the association has merit, the description of the late Ottoman Empire as a "colonial empire" would generate a serious confusion and conflate different economic, social, political, and ideological factors.[35] Well aware of this potentially reductive position, revisionist historians explore the differences between the colonialism of European powers and of Ottomans, underlining the four-centuries-long historic connections between the center and the Arab peripheries that had led to the creation of specific social, cultural, religious, and political networks.[36] They also propose more nuanced terms, such as Selim Deringil's "borrowed colonialism," which signifies "dip[ping] into a whole grab bag of concepts, methods, and tools of statecraft, prejudices and practices that had been filtered down the ages."[37] Makdisi chooses to use "Ottoman Orientalism" to explain the Ottoman representations of Arab provinces and Arabs in reference to European Orientalism, implying both an acceptance of the European discourse and resistance to it.[38] My study explores the entangled characteristics of Ottoman rule in the Arab peripheries along similar lines but relies on case studies drawn primarily from urban forms, architecture, and visual culture.

At the center of the critical debates of the post-Tanzimat era was the turn to the long-neglected Arab provinces (and Anatolia) for economic compensation and to create a new platform of social solidarity. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, one of the main protagonists of the reform movement, articulated the rationale in 1878 in a memorandum to the sultan, in the aftermath of the short-lived constitutional regime (1876–78): "Because of the devastation of Rumelia, the revenues of the government have become reduced by nearly a half. In order to make up for this loss, the most important issue for us now is to render prosperous and increase the wealth of the Anatolian and Arabic provinces. . . . The development of Syria [i.e., Damascus and its environs], Aleppo and Adana would turn this area into an Egypt. . . . This can be accomplished under the aegis of our sovereign."[39]



The same year, evaluating the mistakes made since the beginning of the reform era that had caused the secession movements and highly aware of the European role and interest in Ottoman territories, Midhat Pasha emphasized the importance of solidarity: "What ought to have been done at the outset when reforms were undertaken, would have been to group all these elements round a vivifying and regenerative principle which would have cemented their union; to create for these races a common country which would have rendered them insensible to suggestions from without. . . . if it is desired that serious reforms be carried out, . . . a fusion should be effected of the different races, and that out of this fusion should spring the progressive development of the populations, to whatever nationality and whatever religion they may belong."[40]

The lessons learned from earlier mistakes helped shape future agendas. Following Midhat Pasha's reasoning, even if it was too late to appeal to the people of the European provinces, Arabs could still be drawn into the empire and endowed with an Ottoman identity. The investment of the Ottoman state went beyond the regions specified by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and reached the far-flung corners of the empire. While Syria always occupied the most privileged position, farther peripheries such as Yemen and Trablusgarb gained new attention due to their strategic locations at the borders. A good indication of the importance placed on the Arab provinces during the Abdülhamid era can be seen in the Ottoman state almanacs (*Salname-yi Devlet-i Aliye-yi Osmaniye*): the Arab provinces were placed in the front, with the European ones relegated to the end, the order reflecting the different salaries of the high officers and attesting to the emphasis placed on the appointment of the "most capable" governors to Syria, Hijaz, Baghdad, and so forth.[41]

Continuing to pursue the post-Tanzimat reform agendas, Abdülhamid II (1876–1908) brought an ideological twist to Ottomanism that valorized the institution of the caliphate. He placed a new emphasis on Islam and his religious role as the caliph and reoriented the focus of loyalty from the state to the sultan. As maintained by Hasan Kayalı, Abdülhamid's Islamism had developed in reaction to the European powers and was "the child of changing international and economic relations in Europe and the position that the Ottoman Empire acquired in the neoimperialist status quo."[42] Turning to the Arab provinces, it privileged them as the primary sites of investment. Cities testified to the shift and the scope of modernization; the enduring concreteness of their physicality served as reminders of the Hamidian era's predominant concerns. By the end of Ottoman rule, "the equipment of principal cities like Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem, with broad ways, modern buildings, electric lighting, tramways, and other convenient apparatus [had] made Syria as a

whole the most civilized province of Turkey at his [Abdülhamid's] day," according to a report from Great Britain's Foreign Office.[43] Historians have overlooked Ottoman modernity in Middle Eastern cities until very recently and have commonly associated the urban transformations with the European powers that dominated the region in the aftermath of World War I, continuing the colonial discourse.[44] My study aims to fill this gap.

## RESEARCH MATERIALS: DIVERSE AND DISPERSED

This book synthesizes documentation that, although fragmented, incomplete, and inconsistent, is rich, provocative, and often untapped. The archival data, publications of the time, and visual materials raised many issues concerning their possible interpretations for the study of each empire, as well as for comparative analysis. While making it difficult to offer firm arguments and draw definitive conclusions, the ambiguities allowed me to ask charged questions. They should be evident to readers, as exemplified, for example, in my arguments on the connections between the old cities and the *extra-muros* new quarters in both empires, the development of "regional" architectural expressions for Ottoman Arab provinces and their relationship to the North African *"néo-Mauresque,"* and the affinities between the Ottoman and French visual discourses on race (chapters 2 and 5).

Differences in archives pose a great challenge to comparative studies. The French and the Ottoman archives I consulted presented two significant problem areas for my research: the classification of the documents and their contents. For example, the archives of the French army (Service Historique de la Défense, housed at the Château de Vincennes, Paris), which contain a wealth of textual and visual information on city-building activities in Algeria (under the category of Génie—the engineering works), are organized chronologically and according to region, allowing an understanding of transformation processes. The reports are accompanied by drawings that fill in the details not conveyed in words—such as the building-by-building demolition necessary to build a straight road through a city. Depending on the importance of an operation, as well as the negotiations involved, the number of documents can even be overwhelming. The Prime Minister's Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) in Istanbul do not have a similarly consolidated structure but are organized according to the nature of the matter reported, such as interior affairs (İrade-Dahiliye), or in specific collections, such as Abdülhamid's collection, originally stored at the Yıldız Palace (Yıldız). Data on city building in different provinces can be found under several classifications, turning the research into an arduous, if exciting, adventure with unexpected finds in unlikely places. With rare exceptions, drawings are stored separately and, aside from the annotations on them, are devoid of explanatory texts.

This brief account of archival differences should give some sense of the predicaments involved in comparing the French and Ottoman transformations to urban fabrics. To cite one specific case, the unequal treatment of the rue Nationale in Constantine and a comparable avenue in Aleppo, Hendek Caddesi (chapter 2), must be understood in reference to the archives. The imbalance applies to the entire chapter, signaling the archives as principal actors in the shaping of the book and the methodological flexibility that underlies comparative analyses. This explains to some degree the organization of each chapter as well (there are other considerations), sometimes integrating the two empires, sometimes giving them separate and parallel treatment.

Contemporary publications supplement and contextualize the material gleaned from the archives. The Ottoman *salnames*, almanacs for provinces, make up to some extent for the lack of systematic archival data. Published periodically and representing the viewpoint of the "center," they convey detailed information on multiple aspects of the provinces, including infrastructure projects, urban affairs, and construction of major buildings, as well as the peoples and their customs. In a uniform format that provides long lists of events, administrative units, committee members, and buildings (in addition to selective descriptive entries), the *salnames* themselves testify to the late-nineteenth-century Ottoman penchant for orderly documentation and classification to facilitate gaining and storing knowledge on all aspects of the empire. Compiled at intervals of several years, the *salnames* record the new developments and serve as measures for progress.

Periodicals proved to be especially useful, as they reported and interpreted the main operations. Furthermore, the extent of coverage served to informally rank the importance of projects. Illustrations provided a concrete level of reality, especially with the "documentary" power of photography. The Paris-based *L'illustration* was the nineteenth-century journal par excellence. It enjoyed a considerable circulation among the Ottoman elite and was accepted as the model for several leading periodicals. One, *Malumat* (Information), had a subtitle that flaunted the association: *L'illustration turque*. Arguably, the most important of such journals in the Ottoman Empire was the richly illustrated *Servet-i Fünun* (The Wealth of Sciences), which I used as one of my primary sources. *Servet-i Fünun* systematically reported on the Arab provinces, broadcasting their significance to the empire. Certain projects were spread over a long period, such as the construction of the Hijaz Railroad and the port of Beirut (chapter 1). Pursuing modern journalism, *Servet-i Fünun* sent reporters (with their cameras) to distant regions of the empire and published the articles they sent in installments: in 1312–13/1894–95, Ahmed İhsan toured Syria; in 1313–14/1895–96, Mehmed Tevfik went to Iraq and wrote detailed accounts of his observations of the land, settlements, people, and their habits and customs, illustrating them with the photographs he took (fig. I.2); in 1314/1896, the journal published the correspondence of Sadık Bey, traveling in the African Sahara (the province of Trablusgarb). In addition to these *seyyar memurlar* (traveling officers), *Servet-i Fünun* proudly

1.2 Photograph of Mehmed Tevfik (fourth figure from the left, wearing a fez), the traveling reporter for the journal *Servet-i Fünun*, in Iraq (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 336 [1313/1896]).

credited its photographers *en place*, such as Tevenet Efendi in Aleppo and Mehmed Salih Efendi in Basra.[45]

Photography was invented at roughly the beginning of the chronological period covered by my study and played an instrumental role in presenting the transformations discussed here. It was used in both empires as an effective tool to communicate "real" knowledge on the "margins" (on historic and natural landscapes, the people, and the curiosities) and to convey the nature of interventions to urban fabrics. Along with the "official" photographic missions (famously, Félix-Jacques-Antoine Moulin's eighteen-month expedition in Algeria in 1856–57 to "bring to France . . . precise documents on . . . our great colony" and Abdülhamid II's project to register all aspects of his empire, resulting in a very rich and important collection), private photographers and studios mushroomed in urban centers.[46] Photography quickly turned into an international business and developed lucrative commercial venues, among them *cartes de visite* and postcards, in addition to publications of all sorts. Postcards brought an extraordinary scope and liveliness to visual culture by including the new, the old, the spectacular, the ordinary, and the quotidian (the latter sometimes highly constructed). While all genres existed in both contexts, one aspect of nineteenth-century Middle Eastern photography displays an idiosyncratic difference worth noticing: European and American photographers expressed no interest in the Ottoman modernization of the land, while the photographers working for the Ottoman state had to turn their lenses to the new projects to display the "advances." It is because of this difference that the Abdülhamid collection, housed in Istanbul



University, occupies a unique place among other rich collections of Middle Eastern photography.[47]

During the time period covered in this book, certain literary genres, well established in Europe, were just emerging on the Ottoman scene. Highly relevant for my purposes is the travelogue, whose history in the Maghrib goes back to the early days of the occupation, with works such as Claude Antoine Rozet's *Voyage dans la régence d'Alger* (Paris: A. Bertrand, 1833) and Évariste Bavoux's *Alger: Voyage politique et descriptif dans le nord de l'Afrique* (Paris: Chez Brockhaus & Avenarius, 1841), producing a considerable collection over the decades and well into the twentieth century. Together with the proliferation of "scholarly" books that also began to appear in the 1830s and 1840s, for example, Adophe-Jules-César-Auguste Dureau de La Malle's *Constantine: Recueil des renseignements pour l'expédition ou l'établissement des français dans cette partie de l'Afrique septentrionale* (Paris: Librarie de Gide, 1837) and Camille Leynadier's *Histoire de l'Algérie française* (Paris: H. Morel, 1846), the publications on French North Africa coalesce into an impressive library. Ahmed Midhat, a prominent Ottoman intellectual and prolific writer who was well aware of the European travel literature, acknowledged the importance of the genre not only for gaining knowledge on different parts of the world but, even more importantly, as a useful tool in the service of "colonial enterprises."[48]

Ottoman publications on Arab provinces are few and far between. There are only a handful of travelogues (including some serialized in periodicals), and the names of their authors will become familiar to the readers of this book due to the inevitability of repeated references to their works: Mehmed Refik and Mehmed Behçet, Şerafettin Mağmumi, Mehmed Refed, Hakkı Bey [Babanzade], Cenab Şahabettin, and Ahmed Şerif. The sad state of literature on the Arab lands was bemoaned by Ahmed Şerif upon his visit to Damascus: as he felt lost and like a total stranger roaming the streets of the city, without any knowledge of the historic monuments, he could not but observe foreigners of both sexes going around "as though they were in their own countries," with guidebooks in their hands. Contrasting the knowledge they had on "our country" with "our ignorance and our obstinacy not to get to know our own country," he summed up the situation: "[T]hey had pages, volumes of information on Damascus. But what is written on the topic by us, in Turkish? How many volumes did we have on our own country?"[49]

There are other curious absences in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Ottoman literature: Algeria and Tunisia. In the pages of *Servet-i Fünun*, which published pieces on all corners of the world, I have not come across any textual or visual reporting or commentary on the French projects in Algeria (there is an essay on an iron bridge in Constantine in *Revue technique d'Orient*; see chapter 1). Even the unique episode of technological exchange between French Algeria and the province of Trablusgarb in the 1860s (chapter 2) did not seem to have received coverage in the Ottoman press. Given the profound involvement in urban projects in France since

the Haussmannian operations in Paris (complete with rumors about the personal engagement of the prefect in Istanbul's remaking),[50] the silence on the massive transformations of Algerian cities that bore centuries-old Ottoman imprints is difficult to understand. There are a few glimpses of Tunisia under the French protectorate—for example, in an album in Abdülhamid's photography collection that includes photographs depicting recently opened avenues and new French buildings.[51] In a brief comparison with Trablusgarb, Ahmed Şerif commented that the minute the border was crossed from Tunisia into "our land," "all works of civilization [and] beauties of nature" disappeared. Tunisia was crisscrossed with "orderly roads, telegraph and telephone lines," all displaying a "civilized life."[52] Perhaps it was to avoid an unfavorable comparison that prevented the Ottomans from turning an eye to the French modernity in territories that had formed part of their empire not so long ago.

## STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The book begins on the macroscale, with chapter 1 tracing the infrastructural networks that enabled efficient transportation over long distances: land roads, railroads, ports, and waterways. Their concerted development, based on the technological advances of the nineteenth century, united each empire and provided connections to the rest of the world. The infrastructure projects served many agendas, ranging from military to commercial and even ideological. The processes, policies, and often the intentions of the Ottoman and French empires in carrying out their respective projects display unique stories about the role of infrastructure in empire building in each context. Arguing for the merit of exploring their individual coherent processes, I broke chapter 1 into two main sections but discussed the two contexts in relation to each other, pointing to their intersections and divergences. The topics in other chapters yield to more intertwined discussions, and I structured each chapter according to the specific nature of the material.

From "mastering" expansive imperial lands with technology, in chapter 2 I turn to cities and analyze the interventions that changed the urban fabrics in unprecedented ways. Starting with the operations that cut straight arteries through the old tissue, I move to the implantation of European-style quarters adjacent to historic cores and to the creation of new towns. These major feats of planning and engineering were carefully delineated to evoke the idea of the empire and its modernity, while addressing practical concerns of growth and communication. An additional methodological challenge especially affected this chapter: the present-day status of many cities I consider after the even-greater twentieth-century transformations. In some cases (such as Burj Square in Beirut), the earlier fabric has been completely erased; in others (such as the Marja Square area of Damascus), the remaining fragments are so abstracted and isolated that they do not tell much about their history. To pursue my inquiry, I first had to revert to archaeological research of sorts, reconstructing the urban landscapes with the help of historic plans and photographs.[53]

In chapter 3 I discuss the public square as an ultimate site of imperial expression, as evidenced by its setting, the buildings that define it, and the iconographically charged monuments that adorn it. With blatant associations to Europe, the public squares introduced a new type of urban space to the "Islamic" cities of the Middle East and North Africa and quite rapidly took on central roles. The public park, another urban type that called for the introduction of new social habits, is also examined in this chapter. In chapter 4 I look at the architecture of public monuments. The offices that harbored the imperial administrative apparatus (city halls, government palaces, post offices, police stations, and military structures) introduced new and secular monuments, designed according to European models but in a range of architectural expressions. Placed near each other, they created imperial enclaves of modernity. Other buildings, such as theaters, schools, and hospitals, complemented the image. In chapter 5 I examine a sample from the myriad public ceremonies that affirmed the empires in multiple ways. These ceremonies formed temporary components of the new public spaces and contributed to their memorability. In the epilogue I synthesize the themes of the book and examine again the attitudes of both empires toward their peripheries, from the perspectives of cultural difference, race, and civilizing mission. Drawing attention to the cross-cultural diffusion of such notions, my aim is to broaden and deepen the debate on the concepts of empire, modernity, and colonialism and argue for their further contextualization in reference to built forms and visual culture.

in the case of Damascus, where the insertion of a "government café" claimed at least a prominent part of the park for an exclusive group. The proximity of parks to government buildings (as in Damascus, Beirut, Trablusṣam, and Jaffa) enabled such appropriations, and Ottoman administrators, with their "modern" lifestyles, welcomed the facilities. The most extreme takeover happened in Trablusgarb, where the public park was closed to the public altogether and integrated into the military headquarters (see chapter 2).



# 4

# A NEW MONUMENTALITY AND AN OFFICIAL ARCHITECTURE

## ENCLAVES OF MODERNITY: "A MOUNTAIN OF STONE"/"PERFECT AND REGULAR"

Transformations to cities included new public buildings that introduced unprecedented functional repertoires, as well as different notions of monumentality, architectural expression, and siting principles. In both the Ottoman provinces and the Maghrib, these public buildings were military and civic structures that gave the cities a secular identity, in contrast to the religious buildings that had helped define the urban image in earlier centuries. They were conceived as individual, freestanding buildings with elaborate façades on public spaces and stood apart from the previous monuments, which commonly merged into their surrounding fabrics, often with only an ornate gateway that announced what was behind. Placed in clusters in the regularized areas or the extensions of old cities, the new monuments presented a collective image: spread along a wide avenue (such as avenue de France in Tunis), around a public square (such as Marja Square in Damascus), or simply near each other (as in Sfax). Their cumulative effect resulted in specialized zones that represented the imperial rule over the secular and civic sphere, at the same time enhancing the message of modernity, interlinked to the larger image of the empire. There was one significant difference between the new monuments of the two empires: the insertion of cathedrals in the official centers of cities in the French colonies. Whether strategically located on a public square as in Constantine, at the vista of a main avenue as in Bône,



4.1 Beirut, view of the Grand Serail, with the clock tower in the foreground (*Salname-yi Beyrut* [1326/1910–11]).

or along a main avenue as in Tunis, the cathedrals, architecturally elaborate and grand in all respects, attested to the religious difference of the new rulers.

In Beirut an imperial complex was created incrementally by the construction of the imperial barracks (Kışla-yı Hümayun), also known as the Grand Sérail, in 1851 and the military hospital in 1861 on the hill above the old town. The insertion of a clock tower between the barracks and the hospital in 1898 completed the monumental compound of the central government visible from everywhere (fig. 4.1). Baghdad's skyline, viewed from the western bank of the Tigris, acquired an imperial seal with its longitudinal government palace on the embankment and the nearby clock tower. The strategic choice of sites for these clusters transformed and dominated the overall looks of both cities. In the French Maghrib, the opening of cours Napoléon in Bône shifted all important buildings to this spacious avenue, with the town hall and the theater across from each other, the cathedral closing its vista, and the palace of justice nearby. In Sfax, the juncture between the first and second French extensions to the city became the site of the buildings that represented the imperial presence: the town hall, theater, post office, and other government buildings lining the avenue Jules Gau. As in Beirut and Baghdad, the sites were carefully chosen, responding to the specific conditions of each city and establishing a hierarchical relationship with the existing fabrics.

The late-nineteenth-century interventions marked a break from past expressions of power through architecture. Ottoman construction activity in North Africa and the Middle East had been consistent and significant since the sixteenth century.[1] This practice was characterized by conformity to local architectural norms, with notable exceptions. In some cases, such as the sixteenth-century Süleymaniye in Damascus



and the Sidi Mehrez Mosque in Tunis, the monuments made blatant architectural references to the Ottoman capital and stood apart in the fabrics of the major cities. Yet even then, they did not cause dramatic ruptures with the urban fabrics. As religious monuments, they belonged to the existing norms and types.

The formulaic presentation of "important buildings" in the Ottoman *salnames* underlines the cumulative impact of the new structures on the urban image. These publications brought the nineteenth-century additions to the level of prominence given to historical anchors of urban fabrics (such as the Great Mosques of Damascus and Aleppo) by including them in the same lists to convey general descriptions of particular cities. Nevertheless, the clustering of the recent public structures helped differentiate them in their representative associations: imperial and modern. A survey of randomly selected *salnames* reveals the systematic nature of the siting of the new buildings. In 1883 Sana had four concentrations. Within the walled city, the government palace, civil and sharia courts, headquarters of the provincial administration and the police, telegraph office, publishing house, and high school occupied the southeastern area. Military barracks, ammunition depots, and food storage warehouses were in the east. The military hospital, a police station nearby, and the residence of the governor were in the west. Outside the fortifications, a large military complex included the offices of the commander in chief, barracks, stables, and several gardens.[2] In 1901, Beirut had "a government palace and a town hall and imperial barracks and a military hospital and a college of political science," all "perfect and regular" (*mükemmel ve muntazam*).[3] A few years later, "a military high school and a branch of the Ottoman Bank and administrative offices of the port" were added to the list.[4] The state of "development" (*mamuriyet*) reached by the city was evident in the "regularity and perfection" (*intizam ve mükemmeliyet*) of its government buildings, which added to its "honor and excellence" (*şeref ve meziyet*).[5] At the turn of the century, Baghdad boasted among its "sublime, large, and regular buildings" a government palace, infantry, cavalry, and artillery barracks, an industrial school, the publishing house of the province, high schools, military schools, colleges, municipal buildings, courts, and a military hospital, as well as a hospital for the poor under construction.[6] Mosul's "commanding institutions" (*müessesat-ı emiriye*) in 1907 consisted of "a large government palace," "majestic infantry barracks," cavalry barracks, a military hospital, and an ammunition depot, along the Tigris and outside the walled city.[7]

*Salnames* described the new buildings in a reductive vocabulary, which conveyed the message quickly and clearly, while enforcing it by repetition. An architecture that projected the modernity of the empire had to be regular, impressive in size and quality of materials, and ornamented in a gracious manner. In Damascus, the municipal building was "superior and majestic" (*fevkani ve tahtani*), "adorned and perfect" (*müzeyyen ve mükemmel*); the telegraph and post office was "in stone and regular"

(*kargir ve muntazam*).[8] Trablusgarb's government palace was "perfect" (*mükemmel*) and its municipal hospital "large and regular" (*cesim ve muntazam*).[9] Beirut's government palace was "regular and glamorous" (*muntazam ve mükellef*) and increased the "honor and decoration" (*şeref ve ziynet*) of the country.[10] It was also "elegant" (*dilnişin*); the military hospital was "perfect" (*mükemmel*), and all the buildings of the military compound were remarkable in terms of their "interior and exterior order and ornamentation" (*tanzimat ve tezyinat-ı dahiliye ve hariciye*).[11] In Trablusşam, the government palace was again "regular."[12] Geography and history textbooks for high schools adopted the official presentation format and the vocabulary of the *salname*s and repeatedly highlighted the new building types in addition to the historic monuments. For example, describing Baghdad, a geography textbook appended military barracks, government offices, and police stations as "famous, . . . beautiful and large" (*meşhur, . . . güzel ve cesim*) buildings to its list of important mosques, madrasas, and churches.[13] In his travel account, Mağmumi contributed to the dissemination of the official vision by describing Beirut's Grand Sérail and hospital as "large and ornate" (*cesim ve müzeyyen*) and all its new structures as "in stone and elegant" (*kargir ve zarif*).[14]

The nineteenth-century French architectural culture was very different from the Ottoman one. Architectural education, theory, and practice had developed a sophisticated discourse, especially since the sixteenth century, reaching a new level of dissemination from the 1850s on. In addition to numerous specialized publications and periodicals, the popular journals and newspapers brought architectural debates to the public realm, and the Haussmannian construction activity helped integrate discussions on architecture into everyday life—a condition opposed to the Ottoman scene, where the architectural discourse was just beginning to shift to European norms. The vocabulary that described the new buildings in the Maghrib was hence richer and more nuanced, even critical. It was common for government officers to offer correctives to engineers and architects. For example, in 1844 a letter from the Ministry of War found fault with the unquestioning application of the "construction methods of northern Europe" and the failure to take into consideration climatic differences. The same year, the minister of war wrote to Maréchal Bugeaud reporting that the project for a government palace in Algiers "was lacking in style and ornament."[15] Nevertheless, a simpler terminology ran parallel to the more sophisticated discourse, its repetition resulting in formulas that shifted between the technical, the ideological, and the celebratory. Design principles exalted "symmetry and regularity."[16] The post office in Tunis was a "mountain of stone," an example of the "style of the conqueror".[17] The monuments of the proposed 1858 extension to Algiers were "large and intelligent," "dignified," and "splendid." Furthermore, they met "all conditions of hygiene."[18]



## A KALEIDOSCOPIC VIEW

Without attempting a comprehensive analysis of the new monuments that filled the cities of the Ottoman Middle East and French North Africa (great in variety and in numbers), in this section I will introduce a selection that represents the range, forms a kaleidoscopic picture, and defines a broad framework in order to ask more specific questions. The goal is not to single out any building and examine it in detail but to raise issues that pertain to the collective enterprise. What follows is an unbalanced survey, categorized according to functional types. A few critical case studies are explored in some detail because they effectively highlight characteristics that are relevant to others, treated in brief references. The deliberate focus on the exterior appearances of the buildings helps trace their impact on the transformations of urban images. While the interior organizations cast great light on the changing notions of modernity and will be dealt with in selective examples, my emphasis here will be on the siting, massing, and architectural vocabularies of buildings.

### *Military Structures*

The earlier discussions on infrastructure, urban fabrics, and public spaces revealed the primary importance of the army in both the French and the Ottoman cases. It should come as no surprise that some of the most impressive structures inserted into the cities of the Middle East and North Africa catered to military needs, while conveying a powerful message about power structure and control. In quantitative terms, the construction activity was enormous, accommodating the great numbers of troops and the attendant equipment. The French army in Algeria consisted of 60,000 men in 1840, 90,000 in 1844, and 107,000 in 1847.[19] Although the numbers did not reach those of the French army in North Africa, the Ottoman state increased its military presence in the Arab provinces from Tanzimat on. Following the reorganization of the Ottoman forces, major army corps were allotted to Syria and Baghdad. Yemen and Libya acquired separate units, and often the number of troops was raised.[20] At the turn of the century, 12 new battalions were sent to Yemen to fight against the insurrection of Arab tribes.[21] In Trablusgarb, the increase was from 900 to 12,000 in the 1880s, around the time of the French occupation of Tunisia.[22]

The architecture of military barracks in the French and the Ottoman contexts displays remarkable similarities, particularly in their plans, which follow the same design guidelines regardless of differences in scale or location. This should not be surprising, as the reforms in the Ottoman army followed European models, privileging the French ones. A volume on the "science of architecture" establishes a direct connection. Titled *Fenn-i Mimari* (The Science of Architecture), the book was translated from the French original in the mid-1870s by Mehmed Rıfat, an instructor in

land surveying and construction in the Imperial War Academy.[23] *Fenn-i Mimari* stands as a solid witness to the widespread use of European guidelines and precedents. However, while its importance for the dissemination of technical expertise is indisputable, it should not be considered the sole reference for Ottoman military constructions. The liberties taken in the translation also attest to its use as a flexible reference: when deemed necessary, Mehmed Rıfat inserted his own expertise into the text in response to the requirements of an Ottoman army—such as the provision for the construction of "a perfect sacred mosque" next to the library.[24]

In addition to conveying technical information on construction and principles of design and aesthetics, including the canonical orders and "decoration of exteriors," *Fenn-i Mimari* dedicated detailed sections to the design and construction of barracks for the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The rationale for functional divisions (such as separating the dormitories according to rank in order to avoid inappropriate relations), the right amount of space given to each soldier, formulas for calculating all spaces, and the location and design of libraries, reading rooms, kitchens, laundry rooms, and bathrooms were specified. Site conditions were to determine the overall design strategies: hence, if the barracks was in a walled, large area, it would be good to surround the building with arcades on the ground level; otherwise, arcades should line only the interior courtyard.[25]

The drawings of the barracks in Souk-Arhas in Algeria (fig. 4.2; see also fig. 2.30) and several drawings of barracks found in the Ottoman archives belong to the same nineteenth-century military formats. Like the military headquarters of the French army in Souk-Arhas, the "Şevkiye" (pl. 21) and "Hamidiye" (pl. 22) barracks, both in Syria and both dating from Abdülhamid II's reign, and the barracks in Felluja (undated plan) are all rectangular, symmetrical buildings with similar distributions of the dormitories and service spaces, ceremonial entrances, and either continuous inner arcades (Felluja) or partial ones (Şevkiye).[26] Four projects prepared for different regions of the province of Trablusgarb (1897) reveal another typology, one that places the artillery storage in the center of the structure.[27] The exterior views share a homogeneous rigidity, with the entrances as the only elements breaking the rows of fenestration and giving some individuality to the buildings. The entrance was often arched, but framed in different ways, sometimes by columns, sometimes by decorative stones. The central pavilion could be projected and treated in a more elaborate manner, as in the case of the barracks in Bengazi (pl. 33). A modest example from the province of Trablusgarb displayed a two-story entrance, the second level with a balcony, no doubt intended for ceremonial functions (pl. 23). In terms of architectural principles, there were no significant differences between the Ottoman and French examples, but only some articulations, such as the masonry details and the widespread French use of shutters on windows. However, some unusual experiments took place; for example, the façades of the three-story Caserne Lambert in Bizerte






4.2 Souk-Arhas, military barracks, plan, 1852 (Défense, Génie, Souk-Arhas, 1H 874, art. 3, no. 25).

were surrounded by colonnades and arcaded balconies on all stories that gave the building a light and open appearance (fig. 4.3).

In the cities of both empires, the impact of the military barracks, coupled with their imposing, somber architectural features and immense size, was profound: they sat as unprecedented masses of stone, often at the edges of cities. The scale of one example, the barracks in southern Sana that would shelter two regiments, was effectively conveyed in *Servet-i Fünun* by graphics: a photograph of the main façade was published sideways because it would not fit the page otherwise.[28] The imperial barracks of Beirut, situated in a "dominant, central location" and built in a "beautiful style" suitable to the sultan's grandeur, overshadowed all other structures on the 1876 plan of the city (see pl. 5); the military structures in Constantine on the hilltop, likewise visible from everywhere and much larger than all other buildings, dominated the urban image.[29]

4.3 Bizerte, military barracks (postcard, Défense, Département de Terre, Fonds Michat).



4.4 Mecca, guesthouse, plan (IÜMK 93376).



4.5 Mecca, guesthouse, view under construction (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 341 [1313/1897]).

The formula used for barracks could be adapted to certain other functions. It came in particularly useful for the design of guesthouses (*misafirhanes*), or modern caravanserais, such as the vast facility outside Mecca to accommodate pilgrims (figs. 4.4 and 4.5). Its main spaces consisted of large dormitories, behind which bathrooms were placed. The courtyard and the long corridors provided communal spaces, the former open to the sky and the latter inside the building. The two-story building in stone and in a simple neoclassical style imprinted the image of Ottoman authority onto the ragged landscape, indicating the newly imposed control over the region and challenging the local emirs.[30]

*Karakolhanes*, or police stations, complemented the barracks in establishing control and representing imperial authority. Scattered throughout the empire, they were signature buildings of the Abdülhamid period that expressed the state's tight grip over society. Nevertheless, their exteriors, in contrast to their function and symbolism, were playful experiments in a range of revivalist and hybrid vocabularies, recalling another typical Hamidian building type, the clock tower. A generic Ottoman project for a small *karakolhane* shows a symmetrical one-story structure with a colonnaded entrance and with the offices in the front, the dormitories in the middle, and the service functions in the back; it could be doubled in size by repeating the plan along the main axis (pl. 24). The façade was neoclassical, with marble columns carrying a pediment and giving an official aura to the otherwise-modest building. On a comparable scale, the *karakolhane* in the new neighborhood of Selimiye in Aleppo, designed by the students at the School of Fine Arts in Istanbul and built in local stone, was inspired by crusader castles (fig. 4.6). Its pointed windows, heavy stones



4.6 Aleppo, police station in Selimiye neighborhood (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 211 [1311/1895]).



4.7 Sana, police station (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 463 [1315/1899]).

that articulated the corners, and the crenellated roofline complete with cylindrical minitowers recycled historic local elements in daring combinations. *Servet-i Fünun* described it as "truly elegant" and enjoying "an architectural style of its own."[31] A larger police station in Sana was clad in a neoclassical façade: fancy stonework defined its corners and windows, columns and pediments marked the entrances, and a crenellated roofline complemented its monumentality (fig. 4.7).

The gendarmeries in the French Maghrib were also varied and experimental. In Sfax, the architectural language combined the neoclassical (the symmetrical treatment of façades, the stone basement) with the "Islamic" (the stonework around the arched entries and the windows of the third story) and added a medieval roofline to





4.8 Sfax, gendarmerie (postcard, ADN).




4.9 Philippeville, barracks (postcard).

lend it a military touch (fig. 4.8). In Philippeville, the barracks were purely neoclassical, with the stone detailing at the corners and around the windows similar to that of the *karakolhane* in Sana (fig. 4.9).

A quick look at the transformations made to precolonial buildings in Algeria that were appropriated for colonial use gives us insight into the architectural strategies used in the design of buildings that would represent the French Empire. A number of these appropriated structures were palaces and large mansions that belonged to Ottoman dignitaries who had fled the country after the French invasion. The Palace of Ahmed Bey in Constantine, built a few years prior to the occupation, provides a good case study because of the drastic changes it underwent and because of its deemed architectural importance. Charles Féraud, the chief interpreter of the army, found the palace of "the highest interest" among all the monuments of Algeria as a piece of "*architecture barbaresque*." If not particularly imposing or refined in its details, he saw it as superior to other sumptuous residences of the Ottoman period, thanks to its "elegant and grandiose proportions" and the "seductive reunion" of an "ostentatious taste and Algerian luxury." It was the "most complete type of architecture . . . suitable to the customs and the climate of the country."[32]

Turned into the French military headquarters, the palace also served as the seat of the imperial administration in the province, in conformity with the role of the army as the overseer of civilian affairs during the early stages of the occupation. The transformations began immediately after 1837 and continued during the following decades to accommodate shifting needs.[33] While it would take a monograph to conduct an archaeological examination of the interventions to this building, a quick focus on the northwest side reveals their complexity. The offices concentrated in this section (including the recruitment bureau, the military library, the management services of various departments, and even the kitchen of the division's general) had to be independent from each other and had to have individual entries (some from the courtyard, some directly from the street).[34] To meet these needs, manipulating interior spaces would not suffice, but parts of the building had to be demolished to allow for two straight streets, rue du Centre and rue Sassy (figs. 4.10 and 4.11). The façades on the new arteries expressed the official look in its bare essentials: three stories, separated by horizontal bands of stone, neatly stacked windows with stone trims, a more decorative treatment of first-level fenestration and entrances, and tile-covered pitched roofs (fig. 4.12). Completely at odds with the irregular massing and blank façades of the original palace, the interventions created an image that represented the French presence.

The architects of the town halls in Algeria adopted the "style of the conqueror" in some of the most elaborately decorative buildings of the period. In Oran and Bône, they opted for an extravaganza imported from the metropole of Napoléon III on a monumental scale (fig. 4.13 and pl. 25). In the smaller town of Koléa, the "empire style" was adapted to a villa style by breaking up the mass and with a generous use of






4.10 Constantine, Palace of Ahmed Bey, site plan showing the projected demolitions (Défense, Génie, Constantine, 1H 809, art. 3, no. 256).

balconies; the clock, centrally placed in a broken pediment on the roof level, established its clear link to the typology (fig. 4.14). On a comparable scale, Sidi Bel Abbès's town hall made up for its modesty with the exaggerated height of the roof structure of both the central part and the side pavilions (fig. 4.15). Constantine's remarkably




4.11 Constantine, Palace of Ahmed Bey, partial plan showing the projected transformations (Défense, Génie, Constantine, 1H 809, art. 3, no. 256).




4.12 Constantine, Palace of Ahmed Bey, drawings showing the new façades (Défense, Génie, Constantine, 1H 809, art. 3, no. 256).

4.13 Oran, town hall (postcard, GRI).

4.14 Koléa, town hall (postcard).

4.15 Sidi Bel Abbès, town hall (postcard, GRI).

late town hall, built between 1895 and 1903, almost half a century later than the establishment of the "commune," followed the same tradition in a compact, three-story building with a tall tower above the clock.[35]

Yet, much had changed in architectural practice around the turn of the century. In the aftermath of Napoléon III's notion of *royaume arabe*, the gradual replacement



of policies of "assimilation" of autochthonous populations with those of "association" had produced a more accepting attitude toward local aesthetics. Rehearsed in temporary structures erected for celebrations, in pavilions that represented Islamic lands at universal expositions, and in an unrealized monument to Napoléon III (discussed in chapter 3), elements from "Islamic" art and architecture were applied to Beaux-Arts buildings, culminating in a widespread "style néo-Mauresque."[36] The "Préfecture" of Algiers (1908–13), designed by Jules Voinot and situated on the avenue de l'Impératrice, was one of the most monumental government structures in a neo-Moorish vocabulary (pl. 26). With its white façades, horseshoe arcades, domes, and blue-tile decorations, the Préfecture stood in stark contrast to the surrounding architecture on this "European" strip and inserted a prominent element into the celebrated image of the city from the sea. It could be read as yet another level of colonization and appropriation or as a gesture of acknowledgment to local cultural norms.

If not comparable to the grandeur of the one in Algiers, neo-Moorish town halls proved to be popular in Maghribi cities large and small. In playful arrangements, they offered a wide range of experiments. Raphaël Guy designed Sfax's town hall on a typical Beaux-Arts plan but unsettled its symmetry with a minaret-like clock tower on the side and filling its customary place at the center with an "Islamic" dome (fig. 4.16). The treatment of exterior and interior details repeated the local references. The more modest examples, for example, in Ferryville (fig. 4.17) and Monastir in Tunisia and in Birtouta in Algeria (fig. 4.18), testify to free-spirited variations on the theme.

The same approach shaped other government offices in the Maghrib: neo-Moorish experiments followed the neoclassical ones, with some fluctuations in the sequence. The palaces of justice in Bône and Philippeville adhered closer to neoclassicism, both boasting a Roman aura thanks to their grand triangular pediments; the later one in Sousse was neo-Moorish (figs. 4.19 and 4.20). The post offices in Bône, Constantine, Tunis (1892, designed by Guy, the architect of the neo-Moorish town hall in Sfax), and Bizerte were in the "style of the conqueror," but not the one in Ferryville (figs. 4.21 and 4.22). One of the most memorable post offices in the history of the building type was the neo-Moorish example in Algiers. Designed by Voinot, the architect of the Préfecture, the Grande Poste redefined the prominent corner it occupied with its monumental white mass, arcaded entrance on its beveled main façade, domes at the corners, and selective use of "Islamic" fragments (pl. 27).

The Ottoman state engaged in a comparable venture and used government buildings to express political agendas. It imposed its redefined presence shaped by the post-Tanzimat transformations with the help of a rich taxonomy of government office buildings scattered throughout the empire. Aside from their symbolism and their contribution to the remaking of the urban images, these buildings sheltered a new form of administration, a new bureaucracy based on ordering, systematic documentation, classification, and filing—according to the modernization and centralization




4.16 Sfax, town hall (postcard, Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library).




4.17 Ferryville, town hall (postcard).




4.18 Birtouta, town hall (postcard).

4.19 Philippeville, Palace of Justice
(postcard, Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library).




4.20 Sousse, Palace of Justice (postcard).

4.21 Constantine, post office (postcard, GRI).

4.22 Tunis, post office (IÜMK, album 90598).

4.23 Beirut, Government Palace (postcard, Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library).

agendas. Even if the execution of the reforms remained fragmented, the idea of a central authority was a new concept in Ottoman governance, and architecture conveyed the message effectively. As in the case of the French Empire, the repetition of similar buildings in disparate places reinforced the idea of connectedness.

Government palaces (*hükümet konağı*) were the foremost signs of the Ottoman state. The architectural ambition and range of experimentation in these prominently located buildings were great, regardless of the size and importance of their cities. At times, their huge construction budgets invited criticism based on the argument that fancy structures could not even begin to resolve the serious problems the empire faced everywhere. For example, the Paris-based Young Turk journal *Méchveret* considered the extravagant construction of a government palace in Sana another Hamidian "whimsical idea" to address the harsh political realities of the region and the recurring insurgencies.[37]

Beirut's government palace (1302/1884), sometimes called the Petit Palais or the Petit Sérail (the Imperial Barracks being the Grand Palais), was a matter of great pride to Ottomans (fig. 4.23). Designed by the chief engineer of the province, Bishar Efendi, it stood out among the city's "sublime buildings." It was in the style of "old castles"[38] and "extraordinary attention had been paid to its exterior and interior planning and decoration."[39] Composed of three stories around a courtyard, the latter used as an open-air museum for antiquities found in the region, the palace had eighty-two rooms.[40] The regular, symmetrical, and axial overall design expressed a bold stylistic synthesis of medieval, Renaissance, and baroque elements. Its most idiosyncratic feature was the roofline, which made references to crusader castles with its small circular towers (as seen above, the police station in Aleppo would recycle the same





4.24 Jaffa, government palace (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 335 [1313/1897]).

element a few years later), and a sculptural baroque pediment placed on the projecting middle section of the main façade.

Among the neoclassical government palaces, Jaffa's (1893) distinguished itself with its main façade, defined by four three-story-high Ionic columns (fig. 4.24) and a sculptural roofline. *Servet-i Fünun* praised it as a "solid" and "elegant" building that was worthy of the government: its columns, window details, doors, stairs—in short, everything about it—reflected an excellent "architectural taste" and displayed great harmony and sensitivity to scale.[41] A stripped-down neoclassicism was more common, as represented by two examples: in Horan (1899; fig. 4.25) and in Trablusşam (1894; fig. 4.26). The two *konak*s shared a similar scale and spatial organization: a rectangular mass mostly likely organized around a courtyard, and a main façade divided vertically by a projecting central and two end sections. A portico accentuated the entrance at the center, orthogonal in the case of Horan and with pointed arches in Trablusşam. While both roofs were covered with tiles, a pediment broken in the middle by a plaque with imperial insignia endowed the Horan palace with further monumentality. The decorative stone treatment of the windows and the corners contributed to the effect. Baghdad's government palace revealed a simpler arrangement and architectural vocabulary: it was a longitudinal structure with a flat roof, two pro-



4.25 Horan, Government Palace, inauguration ceremonies (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 514 [1318/1902]).

jecting sections at the two ends, and neatly stacked arched windows (fig. 4.27). Even though built in stone and in a new monumentality, the building's horizontal mass responded to its site on the banks of the Tigris by evoking the river's flow and acknowledged the local architecture in its height and its relative simplicity.

The smaller government palaces give further insight into the variety of architectural experiments. The "government palace with light defense" in a Red Sea town in Hijaz Province (1885) addressed the vulnerable political situation in the region and made an imperial statement by its local architectural references (fig. 4.28). A fortified building, it was firmly sealed from the outside except for the entrance portal, above which a flagpole was placed. Yet, this defensive and introverted architecture related to the vernacular of the area and to the climatic conditions, most likely in an attempt to belong. The "palace" in the small town of Zaviye in Trablusgarb Province (1895) did not need the same kind of protection as the Red Sea post but simply used the regional architectural vocabulary, which extended from the choice of construction materials to the irregular mass of the building (fig. 5.14).






4.26 Trablusşam, Government Palace (IÜMK, album 779/44).



4.27 Baghdad, Government Palace (IÜMK, album 90573).



4.28 Emer, on the Red Sea, Government Palace, plan, 1302/1885 (BOA, Y.PRK.UM 7/84).

Other government buildings sheltered and celebrated the new institutions of the empire and paralleled the architectural idioms of the government palaces. The most memorable features of the Municipal Building on Marja Square in Damascus (1892) were concentrated on its projecting central part: the entrance reached by a set of steps and framed by two columns, a balcony with a sculptural balustrade, inscriptions, and finally the star and the crescent in the pediment (fig. 4.29). The municipality in Trablus-şam (1313/1895) used its street corner site that faced the city's public park creatively: the beveled main façade was dominated by two-story-high Corinthian columns that carried an arch framing the entrance, reached by a set of marble steps (pl. 28). Again on Marja Square in Damascus and at a right angle to the Municipal Building, judicial and government offices, situated next to each other and defining a row of official buildings that terminated in the Hotel Victoria, were humbler structures, and their references, specifically the eaves of their tiled roofs, evoked residential architecture (fig. 4.30). Mosul's Office of Imperial Lands was of a similar scale and massing but had a more monumental, neoclassical effect due to the hiding of its pitched roof behind a high stone cornice, the pilasters that articulated its façades, and the prominent arched entrance. Its main façade faced the government palace across a square with a ceremonial fountain; its back façade mirrored the front and overlooked the Tigris (see fig. 3.20). A "government office" in Yemen (1898) displayed the same dimensions and overall arrangement and, most likely, the same plan (fig. 4.31). Yet,





4.29 Damascus, Municipal Building (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 158 [1310/1894])



4.30 Damascus, government offices lining Marja Square (*Malumat*, no. 157 [1314/1898]).

despite the neoclassical references, the Yemen structure was given a local flavor by the detailing of its roofline and the use of local construction materials. This was a characteristic of Ottoman government buildings in the province, as noted by a European observer who found them "rather imposing" but argued that, because of the consistent use of the "same black stone, . . . quarried in the neighborhood," they shared a "gloomy appearance."[42]



4.31 Yemen, government office (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 496 [1316/1898]).

### *Hospitals*

Hospitals, at first only for the military, were among the earliest French structures in Algeria. The common practice was to transform an existing building. Curiously, as observed in Blida, Oran, and Tlemcen, this would often be a mosque. In Blida, the small hospital could accommodate only 70 beds, but all the surrounding buildings, with the exception of a saint's tomb (*"tombeau de M'barek"*), were claimed for use by the hospital. The tomb was protected from the gaze of Europeans by a wall so that the "indigenous" could continue their visits in privacy.[43] In Oran, the "hôpital permanent de la Mosquée" could shelter 490 beds in 1841; the need for more led to the installment of a "temporary" hospital in a building in the Casbah.[44] Tlemcen's Méchouar Mosque, restored in 1863, was not converted into wards but served as the chapel of the military hospital; despite several demands, the army refused to return it to Muslim use because of its location in the military compound (fig. 4.32).[45] These temporary solutions failed to meet the functional requirements of modern hospitals, mandating the construction of new facilities.

As illustrated by an 1880 modification project for Constantine, already in place in 1840, the new military hospitals were vast structures that reflected their rational organization (see fig. 2.4). However, their doors were closed to civilians. An editorial in the settler newspaper *Tunis: Journal d'Afrique française* brought the issue to public debate. It described the military hospital in the Belvédère quarter in Tunis as designed according to the "desiderata of modern science" in separate pavilions and praised its airy, "almost cheerful" appearance before stating that it admitted "neither the settlers nor the French workers." Arguing for the construction of a large civilian hospital to



serve the settler communities, the newspaper *Tunis* made the case: "In this country, where large numbers of French, including the well-off, do not have families, where many others lack resources, and where distances and absence of rapid communication routes make home care impossible, a Civilian Hospital is indispensable."[46]

The building that served as a civilian hospital in Tunis (Hôpital St. Louis) in the early 1890s was a somber old Arab house, according to the newspaper. It lacked air and light; the long and vaulted rooms that opened onto a narrow patio suffered from humidity. In short, a modern hospital was needed at least as much as the other buildings then under construction, namely, a municipal casino, a theater, and a palace of justice.[47] Most likely, the journalist had in mind as a model the Civilian Hospital in Constantine, built on the hill on the eastern bank of the Rhummel amid larch and pine trees. A vast building organized around three courts, it turned a monumental façade to the city, emphasized by Renaissance-style domes on four corners (fig. 4.33).

The Ottoman army hospitals likewise predated those intended for civilians and formed part of military enclaves. The "large and ornate" military hospital in Beirut (1278/1861) faced the Grand Sérail (imperial barracks) across a landscaped garden and was a matter of great pride, not only because of its architecture but also because it was a modern institution that accommodated contemporary science and conformed to all rules of hygiene. Mağmumi dedicated a long description to it:

> at the entry, one is met by a regular interior garden that is a greenhouse. When you reach the stairs, their purity and cleanliness invite you to take your shoes off. The walls seem as though their fresh paint had just dried; they are entirely white, without even the tiniest speckle. At the entrance of every ward, there is a table with a water jug and a glass and two long seats. The patients eat here in the morning and in the evening. Those who are too sick to get up are served in their beds. The beds are the same color and shape and in the newest style. Nowhere can you detect the odors that normally characterize hospitals. The surgery room, the laundry, and the pharmacy are perfect. In reality, I stood in admiration of this hospital, which surpasses even the examples in the capital.[48]

The same agenda for modernity and the growing concern for public health extended to civilian hospitals, large and small. The new outlook that valorized a modern and scientific approach to health brought hospitals into the secular realm, outside the auspices of religious complexes, which had been a historic association. *Servet-i Fünun* presented the Municipal Hospital in Damascus (1315/1897) with photographs showing not only the inauguration ceremonies (fig. 4.34) but also how it operated according to contemporary standards, namely during a surgery. Sitting on the hill facing the newly opened avenue behind the Süleymaniye complex that led to


Génie.
Direction d'Oran.
Place de Tlemcen.
Amélioration de la Mosquée R.z transformer en Chapelle pour l'Hôpital M.re.
Croquis annexé à la lettre de Command.t Supér.r du Génie, date du 27 Mars 1863, N.o 119
Coupe suivant AB.
Plan de la terrasse.
Elévation suivant CD.
Plan.
Coupe suivant EF.
Alger, le 27 Mars 1863.
Le Général de Brigade,
Commandant Supérieur du Génie, en Algérie.
Echelle de 0.m005 pour 1.m (1/200)

4.32 Tlemcen, Méchouar Mosque, drawings for transformation into a chapel, 1863 (Défense, Génie, Tlemcen, 1H 758, art. 3, no. 60).




4.33 Constantine, Civil Hospital (postcard, GRI).

the train station, the building was clearly one of the new monuments of the city—highly visible and architecturally experimental in a neoclassical style that made a reference to the Great Mosque of Damascus in the clerestoried arrangement of its roof structure. In 1902, a medical school was built behind it, turning it into a teaching hospital.[49]

The last years of the nineteenth century saw a surge in hospital construction, including the *gureba* hospitals (hospitals for the poor). The buildings in el-Deir, on the Euphrates (1895), and Sana (1897) related to local vernacular forms in an attempt to blend into their contexts (figs. 4.35 and 4.36). The Sana hospital was especially notable in its architectural characteristics. A symmetrical and axial structure, marked by a classical central entrance, it had the compositional elements of other modern structures of the time. However, its façade treatment displayed a careful study of the city's architecture—monumental and residential. The category of buildings that addressed public health extended to hospices for the poor. A project for Trablusgarb (1911) preserved the regimented plans of military and public architecture. In a rectangular, walled enclave, the wards were placed in parallel rows, the service rooms pulled against the back wall, and a small prayer hall (*mescid*) placed at the center.[50]

### *Buildings for Education and Culture*

Education lay at the heart of French colonial practices and Ottoman reforms. The link between public education and the state affirmed the authority of the latter over

4.34 Damascus, Municipal Hospital, inauguration ceremonies (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 450 [1315/1899]).

the people and contributed to the glorification of imperial images. Modernizing education paralleled the greater imperial projects, with the belief that it would address and resolve a host of issues, including economic progress, political and social control, and cultural identification.[51]

In the French Empire, schools primarily served settlers and followed metropolitan models. They were the foremost mechanism to unite the immigrants, who came from different parts of southern Europe, by providing them with a shared language and culture; they also took on the education of the autochthonous youth by means of special schools adapted to local norms. The earliest primary schools in Algeria went back to 1832, but a new policy to develop public education was adopted in 1845. The goal was to open "European-style" schools that would accommodate 160,000 students (including 40,000 Muslims) and exclusively "indigenous" ones to educate 92,000 Muslims. The first high school, later named Lycée Bugeaud, dated from 1835; by 1859, Algeria boasted twenty-five high schools and twenty-four middle schools, attended by 3,110 students (225 were Muslims). The first institution for higher education, a military school of medicine, was established in 1832. Schools of law, science, and letters opened in 1879 and were consolidated into the University of Algiers in 1909.[52]

It is noteworthy that in Tunisia, which generally followed the Algerian model, the first "modern" schools predated the colonial era. In the spirit of Tanzimat reforms, in 1837 Ahmed Bey founded a school to train military and administrative cadres, paralleling a series of modernization initiatives he undertook in the army and the admin-





4.35 El-Deir, hospital, inauguration ceremonies (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 353 [1313/1898]).



4.36 Sana, hospital (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 445 [1315/1899]).

istration; it became the *makhab al-muhandisin*, or school of engineering in 1840. The reformist prime minister Khayr al-Din established the Collège Sadiqi in 1875; in five years, up to the date of the French occupation, the school had graduated 120 students. Based on "the model of European *lycées*" and inspired by the Imperial Galatasaray




4.37 Algiers, Lycée Bugeaud (postcard, Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library).




4.38 Oran, high school (postcard, GRI).

High School in Istanbul, the instruction at Collège Sadiqi was in Arabic and Turkish, but the students had to learn either French or Italian—not as a "foreign" language but as a "vehicular language" of modern education. The student uniforms reflected the particular nature of the school, as well as its ties to Istanbul: "hybrid clothing borrowed from young Turkey" that was "neither oriental nor occidental."[53]

4.39 Sousse, middle school for boys (postcard, ADN).

Schools built by the French in Algeria and Tunisia echoed the patterns observed in other building types. An outstanding feature of the high schools was their grand scale. For example, Lycée Bugeaud, in Algiers, occupied a vast terrain next to the old town, and its immense wings etched another striking contrast between the French structures and the precolonial ones (pl. 15). The early preference was for metropolitan designs (figs. 4.37 and 4.38). But, a neo-Moorish architecture became popular toward the end of the century in smaller buildings, mostly in Tunisia (fig. 4.39). Not surprisingly, it was seen as more appropriate for schools attended by "indigenous" students.

The impact of Tanzimat on education in the Ottoman Empire was primarily on the development of a relatively secular public school system, classified by an 1869 law into primary (*ibtidai*), middle (*rüşdiye*), and high (*idadi*) schools and university (*dar ül-fünun*). However, it was during the reign of Abdülhamid II that educational reform was made a priority and undertaken as an urgent imperial project. A prominent statesman described the systematic and overarching approach: "an education council is to be established in every city and town in the provinces. In this way all primary schools are reformed. By hastening to establish public schools, . . . first *idadi*, agriculture and trade schools and subsequently a teacher's college is to be founded in each of the major cities which serve as provincial capitals."[54] The quantitative results registered the growing scale of the initiative: the number of middle schools in the empire increased from 277 in 1879 to 435 in 1888; the number of high schools increased from 6 in 1876 to 55 in 1893 and 98 in 1908.[55]

The architecture of the school buildings was a matter of careful consideration—as expressed in a document summarizing the situation in the provinces of Syria and Beirut in 1892. Comparing the construction of "regular and perfect high schools . . . and even medical schools" by the French, English, and other foreigners with the Ottoman military high school in Damascus, which had not been repaired in twenty-five years and hence was in a ruinous state, the report underlined the importance of impressive buildings dedicated to education. It called for the construction of the military *idadi* from scratch so that its "perfection and order" would improve future benefits and its "beautiful effect" would impress the Arabs.[56] The belief in the power of architecture to make an imperial statement paralleled the French project of imposing a hierarchical visual order in the colonies through monumental structures.

The Ottoman government had given due attention to the architecture of *idadi* schools some years earlier. Upon the orders of Grand Vizier Mehmed Küçük Said Pasha, Esad Saffet Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, had compiled plans and sent them to the capital; in 1885–86, 80 sets of plans were distributed to the provinces. Said Pasha's justification for the adoption of French designs reveals much about the Ottoman elite's consciousness of the power of architectural expression, recognition of the need to revive local historic styles, and the relationship between architecture and modern "civilization":

> Beyond the architectural styles popular in Europe, there is also an architectural style in our country. But decline in every field has affected architecture as well. . . . According to their arbitrary and individual tendencies, some ignorant architects created buildings that bear no connection to Ottoman architectural style and [are based on] their own random rules. In effect, their buildings do not belong to any style. We would like to develop our own national architecture, but it is hard to find experts for this task and we need to improve our construction techniques. The design methods [of Ottoman architecture] do not correspond to the new methods produced through the experiments of civilization and in order to fulfill present needs. . . . Therefore, we have been obliged to order façade drawings and plans from Europe. . . . The shapes and plans of our *idadi*s are in accord with Parisian schools.[57]

The Ottoman schools did not mimic the French ones. The remarkable multiplicity in the architecture of Ottoman educational institutions of all levels from this era points to the likelihood that the architects used the French designs only as suggestions and refined them in response to a growing awareness of regional differences. This awareness was meticulously articulated in *Les costumes populaires de la Turquie en 1873* (see epilogue), an important book that displayed the diversity of costumes in the empire. A main argument in *Les costumes populaires* concerned how clothing was adapted to local climatic conditions, availability of materials, customs, and daily life



patterns. It was only a small step to consider a similar set of criteria in architectural projects.

Like their Maghribi counterparts, the foremost characteristic of the new school buildings was their imposing scale. Often, they would be located outside the old cores, as in the case of the military middle school and the Commercial and Agricultural School in Beirut, the high school in Nablus, and the imperial high school (*sultani*) in Aleppo. The Commercial and Agricultural School in Beirut occupied a vast terrain necessary for its purposes, while the Aleppo *sultani* sat in the middle of a large garden that emphasized its prestige in the grid-planned Cemiliye quarter (figs. 4.40–4.42).[58] Some were built inside the cities: the high school in Jerusalem used the site of an old madrasa, which had been in ruins and was close to the Dome of the Rock in the Muslim quarter,[59] and the military middle school in Aleppo, lodged in a one-story but large building in a garden, faced the Citadel.[60] Their plans adhered to the principles of regularity, symmetry, and axiality but were far from cookie-cutter arrangements. Even though organized around rectangular courtyards, the military middle school in Beirut and the military high school in Damascus were very different buildings: the former had an intimate courtyard with a pool in the center, and the latter had a grander, colonnaded courtyard that worked well with its larger scale (figs. 4.43–4.45). Other plans diverged from the courtyard type. The classrooms in Baghdad's military high school were organized along corridors, with a garden in the back. The plan of the Sana military high school shows yet another variation: although there was a courtyard with a fountain, the layout was deliberately not symmetrical, and furthermore, unlike the typical two-story school buildings, it had four stories (figs. 4.46 and 4.48).

The differences in the plans reveal the attention paid to site conditions, as well as to local architectural conventions. Architectonic qualities and façade compositions enhanced regionalist experiments. While they adopted a basic neoclassicism that had come to symbolize the new Ottoman public architecture, many examples reflected local architecture in the use of materials and incorporation of details. For example, the high schools in Nablus and Baghdad, and the military middle school in Beirut were each built with local construction materials, with clear references to their architectural contexts—as observed in the forms of the arches, fenestration, and roofs. Sana's military high school broke the rules of regularity and symmetry with a nod to the picturesque arrangements of the Yemeni vernacular, down to the window ornaments (as observed in the *gureba* hospital in Sana as well). The careful choreography of these experiments could be linked to the Ottoman interest in Yemeni architecture—as witnessed by the *salname* of 1298/1880 that not only dedicated some discussion to it but also provided a drawing of a "typical" structure (fig. 4.49).[61]

The French Empire represented itself extravagantly in the cultural realm with theaters, placed close to other government structures in the centers of cities. In Algiers,



4.40 Beirut, Commercial and Agricultural School (*Salname-yi Beyrut* [1326/1910–11]).

4.41 Nablus, high school, inauguration ceremonies (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 507 [1316/1900]).



4.42 Aleppo, imperial high school (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division).



4.43 Beirut, military middle school, ground-floor plan
(Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division).



4.44 Beirut, military middle school (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division).



4.45 Damascus, military high school, ground-floor plan
(Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division).



4.46 Baghdad, military high school, ground-floor plan and façade drawing
(Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division).



4.47 Sana, military high school, ground-floor plan
(Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division)



4.48 Sana, military high school (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division).

the theater predated other colonial monuments, underlining the cultural presence of the occupier (see chapter 3). Theaters in other cities copied the architectural grandeur and the prominent setting of the one in Algiers. Constantine's theater (1883), with 800 seats, opened onto place Nemours with arched gates; its ornately decorated façade and interior flaunted the best marble of the region (fig. 4.50).[62] Bône's theater, on the same scale and from the same years, faced the cours National (earlier called cours Napoléon) with a similar row of gates but separated by Doric columns; arched windows, with Ionic columns between them, were stacked above the doors on the second level (fig. 4.51). Oran's theater on the place d'Armes diverted from the model with two ornate towers on the roof level, conceived of as domed pavilions. In contrast to the theaters of Algeria, which were powerful proponents of the "conqueror's style," the Tunisian examples kept their grand scale but exhibited a more playful and whim-





4.49 Sana, drawing of a "typical" building (Veli, *Yemen Salnamesi*, 1298/1880).

sical architecture. Sfax's Municipal Theater (c. 1900), with its references to the ramparts of the old city and façades covered with "Moorish" elements, is the ultimate example of this style (see fig. 3.9).

European-style drama entered Ottoman literature during the second half of the nineteenth century, with a surge of plays in Turkish. A theater was included in Dolmabahçe Palace, municipal theaters were built in Istanbul and Bursa, and the Pera




4.50 Constantine, theater (postcard, GRI).



4.51 Bône, theater (postcard, GRI).

quarter of the capital was dotted with private theaters where foreign groups performed. This scene extended to the major cities of the provinces. For example, in the early years of the twentieth century, there was a theater on the east side of the Sahat el-Burj in Beirut.[63] The building type was far from representing Ottoman culture in the peripheries, however.

## A CHANGING DISCOURSE FOR A NEW ARCHITECTURE: "DECORATION IS EVERYTHING" / "IN HARMONY WITH SPECIFIC TASTES AND AESTHETICS"

The broad-brush view of the architectural scene presented above points to a search for an architectural expression to represent the empire. It also brings to light the encounters with the specific character and historic heritage of the colonized territories. Architectural theory in nineteenth-century France was a well-developed field, with its own traditions, legacy, and myriad publications. The colonial *chantiers* may not have transformed it, but they certainly brought a new flexibility to it, testing and expanding its boundaries. The Ottoman case was far more complicated. The exposure to and adoption of European norms and models that accompanied the post-Tanzimat reforms inevitably came with a reevaluation of the rich Ottoman architectural past and attempts to find a synthesis between the two.[64] In the search that gained momentum from the late 1860s on, the obvious references were to the "classical" period of Ottoman architecture, that is, the great monuments of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, concentrated mainly in Istanbul but also in Bursa and Edirne. The surge of building activity in the Arab provinces introduced a further confrontation, one that raised questions about how to incorporate other layers of the past into contemporary Ottoman work while taking into consideration the significant regional differences. This also meant a new look at what constituted Ottoman architecture and its debts to the early Islamic and pre-Islamic traditions.

Claiming to be picking up where the Romans had left off, the French placed great value on the Roman archaeology of North Africa. They surveyed the sites, carried out archaeological research, and published their findings from the 1840s on, as exemplified in the work of Amable Ravoisié. Ravoisié's three-volume *Beaux-arts, architecture et sculpture: Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie pendant les années 1840, 1841, 1842* (published in 1846–59) documented the rich Roman remains of the colony in macro- and microscale as part of the greater project of linking the colony to the metropole historically and culturally and thereby underlining the right of conquest.[65] In contrast, the French did not value the Islamic heritage in the early decades of the occupation. The transformations to many monuments to fit new uses and their indiscriminate demolition to make room for orthogonal streets and squares exemplify this attitude.

The turning point came with Napoléon III's *royaume arabe* policies advocating

a special fraternity between the French and the autochthonous peoples. Viollet-le-Duc's project for a monument to the emperor (see chapter 3) that acknowledged the Arab heritage was not the unique manifestation of the changing climate. Paralleling it, a discourse that criticized wholesale demolitions and called for the preservation of the "indigenous" towns developed from the 1860s on.[66] Meanwhile, and in part responding to the interest generated by the pavilions of the 1867 Exposition Universelle in Paris, a debate on Islamic art and architecture had entered the French discourse, bringing with it the visual representations of major buildings, mostly from the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Spain, and Persia. The need to integrate the French possessions *outre-mer* in the subsequent fairs expanded this inquiry. For example, the Algerian Palace in the 1878 Exposition Universelle combined fragments from several monuments in Tlemcen; a replica of Mosque el-Kebir's central gate found its way to the same event as a freestanding structure. The same approach was followed in the Tunisian Palace for the 1889 exhibition with a collage of clearly identifiable elements from Tunis and Kairawan, and again in 1900, when both colonies were represented in similarly assembled structures.[67] In effect, these temporary pavilions provided rehearsal grounds for architects who would play key roles in the study of Islamic architecture and its integration into neo-Moorish buildings in Algeria and Tunisia. To name two, Saladin was the architect of the 1889 Tunisian Palace, while Albert Ballu, responsible for the Algerian Palaces in 1889 and 1900, would serve as the chief architect of the Monuments Historique de l'Algérie from 1889 to 1927.

Edmond Duthoit's *"mission architecturale"* (conducted in 1872) documented Tlemcen's urban forms, streets, monuments, and architectural details as a first step to incorporating Algeria's Islamic past into the official heritage of the colony, complementing Ravoisié's work on Roman antiquities.[68] Duthoit would go on to serve as the first director of the Service des Monuments Historiques (1880–89), the institution responsible for classifying, recording, and restoring historic monuments, including mosques and palaces. Albert Ballu's meticulous drawings that showed the buildings in plans, sections, elevations, and perspectives, along with many of their details, feature among the documents produced under the auspices of the service in the 1880s (figs. 4.52 and 4.53). Shown in the salons of Paris, the drawings called attention to the aesthetic value of Algeria's prominent precolonial monuments, such as Mosques el-Djedid and Abd el-Rahman. In a few years, the list of buildings under the direction of the service extended to smaller mosques, *marabouts* (mausolea), tombs, and fountains, as well as to larger houses from the Ottoman period.[69] Meanwhile, the increasing number of Islamic artifacts in the museums in Algeria, established by the French initially for antiquities, contributed to the valorization of the country's Islamic heritage.[70]

A significant step toward incorporating something from this architecture into the otherwise-French buildings of the Maghrib was initiated in Algeria during the





4.52 Algiers, Mosque el-Djedid, façade drawing by Albert Ballu (MHS, Fonds 81/99-01, Algérie).



4.53 Algiers, Mosque Abd el-Rahman, façade drawing by Albert Ballu (MHS, Fonds 81/99-01, Algérie).

tenure of Governor Charles-Célestin Jonnard. He stipulated in 1906 that all public buildings would be given an "Oriental style . . . in harmony with the monuments left in the colony by Arab civilization and with the light and gracious works that inspired in Algeria memories of Byzantine art,"[71] interestingly citing a Christian heritage in order to give Islamic art and architecture a veneer of respectability. In Tunisia, the desire to create an architecture that would be specific to the place had emerged immediately after the conquest. The decision not to cut through the precolonial town was accompanied by a romantic embrace of its architectural forms. One admirer "dreamt of the heart of the city with its great palaces, palaces in marble, ornate small columns, polychrome balconies, and an architecture that is impossible at home but realizable in the country of magicians and genies."[72] Saladin, the architect of many neo-Moorish buildings in Sfax, attributed the success of Arab architecture to the treatment of surfaces with beautiful tiles as "cladding." "On a reductive building," he commented, "ornamentation is nothing but a veneer, or even simply painting. . . . Arabs are the past masters in this art of veneering and their tiles are beautiful."[73]

The neo-Moorish buildings included in the kaleidoscopic view offered above utilized pieces of the precolonial architectural heritage exactly as "veneer," without any inquiry into its spatial and architectonic characteristics. The theoretical debates, the scholarly documentation, and the easy accessibility of the monuments in the colonies did not change much about the French discourse on "Islamic" architecture from the 1860s to the first decade of the twentieth century. Charles Edmond's statement in 1867 that "In an Arab building, decoration is everything, and the beauty of the ensemble depends on the harmonic and difficult fusion of details,"[74] maintained its authority, to be endorsed by Viollet-le-Duc, who argued that "from time immemorial . . . Arab conquerors lived in tents. . . . They had no luxury other than fabrics and weapons. For them, as for the Jews of the primitive period, the monument was nothing but the tent, the hut, covered with a precious fabric."[75] Calling for a halt to the proposed changes to the Résidence des Evêques, an already much-transformed Ottoman palace in Algiers, Charles Chevalier, the architect in charge of the conservation of historic monuments, described the positive qualities of its courtyard solely as "decorated with plaster and marble sculptural elements, tiles, and bronzes, representing the best that Moorish art produced." The Service des Monuments Historiques continued to praise the decorative elements in buildings to be classified for preservation: for example, Mosque Abd el-Rahman offered "some curious details" in its minaret and surrounding stairs, and its *zawiya* distinguished itself with a large number of "beautiful Persian tiles."[76] The French practice in Algeria and Tunisia, then, remained faithful to this enduring reading of "Islamic" architecture by creating a surge of buildings with an Islamic veneer and details; they maintained their "European" character in all other aspects.

Ottomans had, of course, built monuments in Arab provinces under their names



since the sixteenth century. The post-Tanzimat construction scene represents both continuity and novelty. Studying fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Ottoman drawings, Gülru Necipoğlu-Kafadar has shown that architectural ideas were disseminated effectively throughout the empire by grid-based ground plans, accompanied by imprecise elevation sketches. This was in accord with the Ottoman attitude that accepted variations in façades and interior treatments in response to local traditions while expecting that the ground plans would remain faithful to the plans sent from the capital.[77] The nineteenth-century practice seems to have been based on this earlier tradition, leading to the production of government palaces and schools, for example, with similar plans but different elevation treatments, the latter stemming from the use of local materials, forms, and decorative elements. The big change was in the shifting of construction activity to secular building types. Nevertheless, mosques and other religious structures, expressing regional characteristics, continued to be funded by the government, with a considerable surge during the Hamidian period.[78]

Other developments began to lead the way to rethinking regional differences so that they would coalesce into a larger entity under the banner of the empire and give the Ottomans a modern national definition based on multiplicity. The appropriation of pre-Islamic heritage, in the footsteps of the European interest in antiquities, played an important role. Laws were passed to prevent the smuggling of antiquities (the first law dates from 1874; it was revised in 1884), Ottoman inspectors controlled the activities of foreign archaeologists, Ottomans conducted their own excavations (most notably Osman Hamdi's work), and the artifacts transported to Istanbul were displayed in museums, leading to the establishment of the Imperial Museum, "similar to those in other civilized countries."[79] As argued by Makdisi, claiming antiquities as part of the Ottoman heritage turned around the European metaphor that equated the ruinous state of ancient remains with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, in an attempt to endow the empire with a layered and complex history.[80] This also meant linking the empire to the European cultural heritage, emphasizing its current modernity. The neoclassical architecture of the museum in Istanbul stated the connection explicitly.[81]

Knowledge about archaeological excavations and sites was collected and disseminated in the empire in other ways as well. For example, Abdülhamid's photography albums were filled with images of antique sites, and publications informed the public in various formats. *Servet-i Fünun* included reports and photographs in the 1890s.[82] *Salnames* consistently reported on the *asar-ı atika* (old works) of the region; they sometimes gave detailed descriptions but often provided only annotated lists. Mehmed Refik and Mehmed Behçet's *Beyrut Vilayeti* was a comprehensive presentation. After a brief introduction underlining the vast construction activities of all the past states established in Syria and attributing their current ruinous state not only to the many wars but also to the "ignorance of Syrian people," the authors gave sum-

maries under five categories: "prehistoric," Assyrian, Phoenician, Greek and Roman, and Arabic, highlighting the key monuments from each period, such as the palaces and temples built by David and Solomon from the prehistoric period, the Greek kings' tombs in Saidon, and the Roman towns of Tedmur, Baalbek, and Gerash, with their landmark "rows of columns that crossed the entire settlement from one gate to the other."[83] The embracing of this historic diversity explains much about the regional references in the new imperial architecture.

Refik and Behçet's discussion of an "Arab" period points to its perception by Ottomans as distinct from their own culture. They argued that the initial reliance on "Yunani" (Byzantine) architects explained the similarities with "Western and Christian" styles, but later Arab architecture developed its own forms, characterized by domes, courts open to the sky, and stalactite decorations.[84] *Salnames* revealed the hierarchy of "Arab" monuments, not surprisingly, ranking the old central mosques, for example, the Great Mosque of Damascus, above others. Furthermore, the museum conducted archaeological work on a late-eighth- to early-ninth-century Islamic site, extending the mission of the discipline beyond antiquity and acknowledging the cultural and artistic importance of the early Islamic era. Raqqa, the sometime residence of Harun al-Rashid on the Euphrates River to the west of Aleppo, was excavated in 1905 upon the orders of Osman Hamdi, then director of the museum, and under the supervision of Theodor Makridi, an Ottoman-Greek numismatist (fig. 4.54). The artifacts from the site—china and pottery—were transported to Istanbul and given an entire display hall in Çinili Köşk (the Tiled Kiosk), an annex to the museum across from the new building.[85] The museum had opened an Islamic Arts Section in 1889, and despite its relatively slow growth in comparison with the Greco-Roman-Byzantine collection, the scholarly interest in Islamic culture echoed Abdülhamid's pan-Islamist policies. It also celebrated the "Arab civilization" for its great contribution to the "advancement of knowledge of science and literature and arts across the world" and acknowledged it as another layer of the empire's complex heritage.[86]

An awareness of the historic specificities of the "Arab" period surfaces in the debates around the restoration of the Great Mosque of Damascus. While it was routine to repair all major monuments, the rebuilding of the Great Mosque, burned in a major fire in 1893, was a task of a different magnitude that stimulated discussions about stylistic issues and attracted public attention to early Islamic architecture (fig. 4.55).[87] Caused by the sparks from the braziers and *narghiles* of the workers making some minor repairs in the building and spread quickly by brisk winds, the fire had moved from the mosque to the fabric around it, destroying 175 shops and 26 houses within 45 minutes. The mosque was entirely ruined, its columns broken into small pieces and its walls so weakened that they were in danger of collapsing at the first rain.[88] The initial restoration project, undertaken by Evkaf-ı Hümayun (Office of Imperial Endowments), reconceived the "interior and exterior design [of the mosque]






4.54 Raqqa, Baghdad Gate (Dr. Jean-Alexandre Otrakji, www.mideastimage.com).

entirely according to the new-style architecture."[89] Assuming a controlling role over the totality of the empire's cultural and artistic heritage, the Directorate of the Imperial Museum challenged this position and proposed a scholarly approach to the restoration of historic monuments. This shift was no doubt influenced by European discourses on restoration and preservation of the time, especially by Viollet-le-Duc's advocacy of remaining faithful to original structures,[90] but it also meant an informed reading of early Islamic architecture.

Osman Hamdi, the director of the museum, explained that the Office of Imperial Endowments aimed to clear out all historic elements of the mosque, including the marble decorations and columns that lined the large courtyard, and replace them with new pieces fabricated according to patterns taken from the surviving parts of the building. Yet, he argued, the extraordinary historic importance of the mosque mandated the kind of restoration that would return it to its original architectural and artistic state. To this end, it was essential to repair the damaged columns and all other fragments. Even from the economic point of view, restoration was more advantageous than new construction.[91] The museum's authority was acknowledged in the immediate assent to rebuild the Great Mosque according to its original form, using the restored original pieces.[92] The director then voiced the need for "perfect plans and drawings of the building according to scientific methods"[93] and demanded that an architect be appointed to the job.[94] Eight years later, *Servet-i Fünun* published a series of photographs that provided a comprehensive documentation of the almost-completed restoration. The photographs depicted general views of the interior and the courtyard, the *mihrab*, *minbar*, doors, columns, and mosaics—meticulously restored to their original forms. One photograph emphasized the complicated process: the transportation of columns, repaired elsewhere, through the city streets by means of a carriage designed specially for the task (figs. 4.56–4.58).[95] Collectively, the photographs



4.55 Damascus, Great Mosque of Damascus, after the fire
(Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library).

conveyed the magnificence of one of the earliest mosques, whose pre-Ottoman historicity was obvious from its name: Emeviye Camisi, the Umayyad Mosque. The investment in the restoration and the attention paid to details, strikingly different from those of Istanbul mosques, emphasized the cultural and aesthetic value of the monument. Its furbishing, which included 400 square meters of new rugs specially woven in factories in Hereke (to the east of Istanbul), reiterated the impressive scale of the operation.[96] This was an imperial endeavor that incorporated the "Arab" past into present-day Ottoman identity, capitalizing upon the visibility of a major monument.

Attempts to represent the empire comprehensively at universal exhibitions contributed to thinking about regional characteristics. In that vein, a "Palace of Damascus" was included in the Ottoman village at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893. The pavilion displayed an amalgam of Damascus's public and private architecture, with its monumental entrance quoting the great khans. A richly decorated room, surrounded by a wide divan on all sides and with a marble-paved





4.56 Damascus, Great Mosque of Damascus, interior view after restorations
(*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 597 [1318/1902]).

vestibule with a fountain, brought the most admired features of the city's mansions to the new world. The main Ottoman pavilion in the same exhibition, a strikingly modern building in its massing and overall composition, presented a more synthesized vision of Syria: the wood panels of its façades, "carved in arabesques and traceries," were fabricated in Damascus by local artisans.[97]

In accord with these developments, the late-nineteenth-century Ottoman architectural discourse expressed sensitivity toward regional expressions while searching for a modern language that would embrace the historic and geographic multiplicity of the empire. This was a new genre, struggling with birth pains and dealing with difficult issues. Fragmented and often inconsistent with each other, the debates were spread over reports to the government and articles in periodicals of general interest (*Mecmua-yı Ebuziya* and *İkdam*) and specialized ones (*Revue technique d'Orient*), as well as in a few books. An undated document from the Hamidian period, titled "Unsigned Summary Report on the Development of National Fine Arts and the Provision of Opportunities," crystallized two trends that pertain to my inquiry in this chapter: the definition of Ottoman architecture and an understanding of regional differences.[98] With the disappointing current state of Ottoman fine arts as its departure point, the exposé investigated the "national fine arts in Ottoman lands" and, briefly surveying the development phases of each branch (architecture, painting,



4.57 Damascus, Great Mosque of Damascus, interior view after restorations (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 597 [1318/1902]).

carving, pottery, tile making, etc.), offered venues to rejuvenate them. The Ottoman "science of architecture" (*fenn-i mimari*) was considered a synthesis of Roman and Byzantine structural experiments (construction of domes and large arches) and Arab and Persian decorative ingenuity—the associations characteristically mirroring the European discourse. Scrutinizing recent buildings in the capital led to the conclusion that their overwhelming hybridity was nothing to be desired. Being "neither Turkish nor Arab nor Gothic," they exemplified an era completely lacking in character. The alternative was some kind of purity, dependent on local architecture.

In an 1896 article, titled "Old Ottoman Style Decoration and Contemporary Decoration," Ebuziya Tevfik also argued for regionalism in architecture: "different peoples have different architectural styles in harmony with their specific taste and aesthetics." The differences applied to history, as well as to current architecture—as best





4.58 Damascus, Great Mosque of Damascus, view of the courtyard during restorations, showing the transportation of columns (*Servet-i Fünun*, no. 598 [1318/1902]).

illustrated in Europe by the multiple Gothic traditions developed by Germans, Italians, French, and English. In his survey of historic styles, the author listed the "Oriental" one (*Şark uslubu*), collapsing into it Arab, Persian, Indian, and Central Asian cultures, and, echoing the previous document, attributed its originality to interior treatments. He noted that in the late nineteenth century, the Oriental style had been revived in the "Moresk," an interpretation of the forms developed by the "conquerors of Andalusia" to suit new tastes.[99]

Celal Esad, arguably the first Ottoman "art historian," offered a more systematic view, first in a series of articles, then in his books. Concerned also with the state of the art, his goal was to retrieve the legacy of Ottoman architecture and to revive it in contemporary practice. He began by criticizing the reductive European assumption that made no distinction between Persian, Arabic, and Ottoman art.[100] Focusing on "Arab art," he deconstructed the contradictions in the European discourse that denied artistic creativity and originality to Arabs on the one hand and maintained on the other that Arabs were superior to Romans in their artistic and scientific achievements—opinions expressed in Gustave Le Bon's *Civilisation des Arabes*. Esad showed that, regardless of their different positions, European authors agreed on the derivative

nature of Arab art, seeing it as an imitation of Syrian Byzantine and Coptic forms. This was a major error, based on a general misunderstanding of all artistic formations, because the arts of all peoples developed in response to each other, revealing "profound and continuous influences." He asked: "Can there be an art with no parentage?" Yet, the character of each culture manifested itself in its own synthesis. For example, even a quick comparison of Arab and Ottoman buildings revealed significant differences in the forms of columns, arches, capitals, and domes, as well as the ensemble of compositions: the "severe simplicity" of Ottoman architecture distinguished it from Arab precedents and owed something to the Byzantine tradition. As to the decoration, the Ottoman examples were a great deal more "somber" and not a literal imitation of Arab forms.[101]

Celal Esad elaborated further on "national styles" (*milli üslub*) in the introduction to his *Mimari Tarihi* (History of Architecture) and attributed their genesis to the climatic and natural conditions of the place, the material and spiritual needs of the people, as well as their specific tastes—all interconnected. To explain cross-cultural influences, he made an analogy to plants that transformed their shapes from one climate to another and argued that wars, artists imported from other countries, and slave workers brought new forms and interpretations, contributing to the "national culture" of a particular place. Using "national style" synonymously with "style of the race" (*ırkın üslubu*), he gave it a dynamic character that stemmed from the changing times and the individuality of the artists.[102]

The debate on the character of Ottoman architecture continued up until the eve of World War I, pursuing similar arguments—as manifested by several articles in *Revue technique d'Orient*. Ottoman architecture had interpreted the "svelte" lines of Byzantine monuments but received its inspiration for details and decoration from "Arab buildings of the Umayyads and Fatimids, notably in Damascus and Cairo," to create an effect of "marvelous delicacy." In short, "Ottoman architecture was the quintessence of Byzantine architecture Islamized in its ensemble and dematerialized in its details."[103] The Arab and Persian influences had shaped the essence of Ottoman architecture, as revealed in the new Central Post Office in Istanbul by Vedad Bey (pl. 29), which attested to the complexity of Ottoman "national character" in architecture. In this important building, Vedad Bey did not present his references literally but explored the ideas behind them. The Central Post Office thus served as a corrective to the buildings produced by the current *"écoles de Moghreb"* and implicitly urged comparison with the post office in Algiers.[104]

Fragmented, repetitive, brief, incomplete, and often derivative, such arguments help explain the regionalism observed in the public architecture of the Ottoman Arab provinces. Thus, for example, the Ionic columns of the governor's palace in Jaffa and of the monument to the Hijaz Railroad and telegraph in Haifa embraced the region's Greco-Roman history; the medieval towers that adorned the roof of the police station in Aleppo and the Government Palace in Beirut incorporated the crusader castles into the imperial repertoire; the Hospital for the Poor and the military high school in Sana acknowledged and claimed the beauty of the Yemeni vernacular. Collectively, they drew an image of the Ottoman Empire that was dynamic, rich, and varied in its historic and cultural resources, while remaining respectful of regional differences.

Having read parts of the manuscript, a friend remarked on the value of rethinking the locations recent events have familiarized us with in fresh terms, other than those imposed by contemporary conflict. To begin to understand their histories, including the dynamics of their complex relationship to what it meant to be "modern," would help break through our received one-dimensional and frozen images.[83] As involved as I was in figuring out certain themes in the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century history of the Middle East and North Africa, their implications for today haunted me continuously. This book is not written with an explicit agenda to make sense of today's politics, but to explore certain developments prior to World War I in a cross-cultural framework. My perspective is very different from Rashid Khalidi's in his remarkable *Resurrecting Empire*, which was conceived specifically to fill a gap in American readers' knowledge by contextualizing current events with historic analysis of the struggle for hegemony in the Middle East.[84] However, I share Khalidi's concerns wholeheartedly and hope that my study makes the geographies and cities it deals with historically more accessible and meaningful.



# NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

1. I borrow the phrase "connected world of empires" from C. A. Bayly and Leila Tarazi Fawaz. See their "Introduction: The Connected World of Empires," in Bayly and Fawaz, eds., *Modernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). The essays in that volume cast a new look at the intellectual and political culture of modernity in the Middle East and South Asia, focusing on the Ottoman and British empires. The use of the word "empire" needs some explanation at the outset. After all, during the time period covered in the present book, France was first an empire, then a republic (Second Republic, 1848–52), empire (Second Empire of Napoléon III, 1852–70), and republic again (Third Republic, 1870–1940). "Empire" is understood here in its broader meaning, closer to the definition "a group of nations or states under a sovereign power" in *Webster's Dictionary*. The sovereign power hence may or may not be an emperor; the issue is sovereignty of the metropole over geographically distant lands and culturally different societies. The Ottomans referred to their territories, not as an "empire," but as a "sultanate" and, in a better description for my purposes, as *memalik-i mahsura* (well-protected domains).

2. Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 1–2. In this study, I kept the references to theoretical sources to a minimum, not because I disown the myriad influences that shaped my thinking (they will be obvious to many of my readers), but because I did not want to burden the text with transparent reminders that often risk turning into repetitive lists of familiar names and texts.

3. I will use the Ottoman names for the two Tripolis to avoid confusion: Trablusgarb (Tripoli of the West) for Tripoli, Libya; and Trablusşam (Tripoli of Bilad al-Sham) for Tripoli, Lebanon.

4. Historians have begun to question these bilateral models. Most significantly, see Julia Clancy-Smith, "Migrations, Legal Pluralism, and Identities in Pre-colonial Tunisia," in Patricia Lorcin, ed., *Identity, Memory, and Nostalgia: France and Algeria, 1800–2000* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

5. I, too, have contributed to the tendency to see only the influences extending from Europe to the Ottoman Empire and not the two-way flow of ideas: see my *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986; paperback, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).

6. Jens Hanssen, "Practices of Integration—Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire," in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber, *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), 57–58. Isa Blumi also argues the case in his study of Albania and Yemen, which he sees as "a departure from more conventional methods of narration." By considering the "two edges" of the empire, he aims to bring to light "the role of the province, its peoples, its socioeconomic links to the world around it to affect change in the Empire," and to deconstruct the perspective that focuses on the "ideological *raison d'être* of the métropole" for its "oversight of the nuanced local reactions to these attempts to impose imperial power." Isa Blumi, *Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and Yemen, 1878–1918* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2003), 14, 17.

7. My study is inspired by and indebted to many scholars whose work has dealt with aspects of late Ottoman cities and visual culture, including Isa Blumi, Selim Deringil, Jens Hanssen, Thomas Kühn, Ussama Makdisi, İlber Ortaylı, and Stefan Weber. Historians of colonialism in North Africa are also beginning to look at the "other" perspective. See, e.g., Isabelle Grangaud, "Masking and Unmasking the Historic Quarters of Algiers: The Reassessment of an Archive," in Zeynep Çelik, Julia Clancy-Smith, and Frances Terpak, eds., *Walls of Algiers: Narratives of the City through Text and Image* (Seattle: University of Washington Press; Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2009).

8. Armand Mattelart, *Mapping World Communication: War, Progress, Culture*, trans. Susan Emanuel and James A. Cohen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 4.

9. W. P. Andrew, *Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India* (London, 1857), quoted in Yakup Bektaş, "The Sultan's Messenger: Cultural Constructions of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847–1880," *Technology and Culture* 41, no. 4 (October 2000): 669.

10. Quoted in Armand Mattelart, *The Invention of Communication*, trans. Susan Emanuel (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 52.

11. Ibid., 11.

12. Mattelart, *Mapping World Communication*, 7–8.

13. Mattelart, *Invention of Communication*, 104, 105. On Chevalier, see also Michel Lavallois, "Essai de typologie des orientalistes saint-simoniens," in Michel Lavallois and Sarga Moussa, eds., *L'orientalisme des saint-simoniens* (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2006), 121–23.

14. Bektaş, "Sultan's Messenger," 670, 676; Roderick H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923: The Impact of the West* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 137–38. It should be added that efficient communication networks, especially the telegraph,



endowed subjects with "a political voice" by making it possible to reach all levels of government easily. Eugene Rogan makes the case convincingly: Eugene Rogan, "Instant Communication: The Impact of the Telegraph in Ottoman Syria," in Thomas Philipp and Birgit Schaebler, eds., *The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation; Bilad al-Sham from the 18th to the 20th Century* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998), 113–28.

15. For a reproduction of the "Map of the New Regime," dating from 1790, see Roland Schaer, Gregory Claeys, and Lyman Tower Sargent, eds., *Utopia: The Search for the Ideal Society in the Western World* (New York: New York Public Library/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 198.

16. On local administrations see İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli İdareler (1840–1876)* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974).

17. Hüseyin Tosun, ed., *Midhat Paşa'nın Suriye Lahiyası* (Istanbul: Cihan Matbaası, 1324/1906), 7–9.

18. S. John Summerson, "Urban Forms," in Oscar Handlin and John Burchard, eds., *The Historian and the City* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963), 165–66. I use Summerson's definition of an architectural historian's "urban history," to which I was first drawn in my dissertation (1984, revised as *Remaking of Istanbul*; the reference to Summerson is on p. xvii). It continues to explain the essence of my approach to built forms.

19. Literature on French rule in Algeria is extensive. For this brief introduction, I relied mainly on Ch.-Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964); and Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale (1830–1954)* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1991). The quotations are from Ageron, 7–8, 17–18; and Stora, 21.

20. Quoted in Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 28.

21. Ibid., 31.

22. Leon Carl Brown, *The Surest Path* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 23–24, 151, 81 (quotation), 115.

23. Ahmad ibn Abi Diyaf, *Consult Them in the Matter: A Nineteenth-Century Islamic Argument for Constitutional Government*, trans. L. Carl Brown (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2005), 104.

24. Brown, *Surest Path*, 116. On Khayr al-Din's commitment to Tanzimat reforms, see also Julia Clancy-Smith, "Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi and a Mediterranean Community of Thought," in her *Migrations: Trans-Mediterranean Settlement in Nineteenth-Century North Africa, 1820–1881* (forthcoming), chap. 8.

25. William L. Cleveland, "The Municipal Council of Tunis, 1858–1870: A Study in Urban Institutional Change," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 9 (1978): 39–40.

26. Quoted in *La Tunisie: Terre française* (Paris: Société Française d'Éditions, 1930), 49, 55–56.

27. Abdallah Laroui, *L'histoire du Maghreb* (Paris: François Maspero, 1976), 2:88.

28. Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 11.

29. Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 2002). Accessed online at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/107.3/aho30200076 (quotation from paragraph 7).

30. See Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli İdareler.* For a summary of the development of the municipal code, see Michael J. Reimer, "Becoming Urban: Town Administration in Transjordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37 (2005): 191–92.

31. Quoted in Edmond Bernet, *En Tripolitaine* (Paris: Fontemoing, 1912), 242–43.

32. Quoted in Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2 (April 2003): 327. Deringil summarizes a report from 1885 in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul (BOA): Y.EE 14/292/126/8.

33. "Introduction: Towards a New Urban Paradigm," in Hanssen, Philipp, and Weber, *Empire in the City,* 6–10.

34. Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery,'" 311–13; Edhem Eldem, "Istanbul from Imperial to Peripheralized Capital," in Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, eds., *The Ottoman City between East and West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 200.

35. An important report that summarized the achievements during the ten-year tenure of Ahmed Rasim Pasha, the governor of Trablusgarb, serves as a good indicator of the specific rapport between the Ottoman reformers and the locals. The lists that itemize the buildings and infrastructure work classify the funding sources: in addition to the municipal budget, they cite construction financed by "the commercial sectors and the people" (*tüccar ve ahali*), including not only commercial establishments but also mosques and madrasas. BOA, Y.EE (1308/1890–91).

36. "Introduction: Towards a New Urban Paradigm," in Hanssen, Philipp, and Weber, *Empire in the City,* 7–8.

37. Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery,'" 312.

38. Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," paragraphs 1–2.

39. Quoted in Engin D. Akarlı, "Abdülhamid II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System," in David Kushner, ed., *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social, and Economic Transformations* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 75. For the first Ottoman constitutional period and the parliament of 1877–78, see Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).

40. Midhat, "The Past, Present, and Future of Turkey," *The Nineteenth Century,* no. 16 (June 1878): 986, 992–93.

41. Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1962), 8:331; François Georgeon, *Abdulhamid II: Le sultan calife* (Paris: Fayard, 2003), 184.

42. Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 32. The Young Turks, who had forced Abdülhamid to declare a constitutional government in 1908, formulated their policies in response to Hamidian policies. In their concern to build a "nation-state," they confronted center-periphery relations, prominent among which was the integration of the Arab provinces into a modern political entity. Through identification with the state and the country (through the sultan, but now in a constitutional monarchy/representative government), they aimed to create a "civic-territorial" Ottoman political community. Ibid., 9. Their urban policies followed the already established models.



43. The Great Britain Foreign Office report (1920) is quoted in Ruth Kark, *Jaffa: A City in Evolution, 1799–1917* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press, 1990), 39–40.

44. To refer to a few examples, the new neighborhoods of Aleppo designed on grid plans have been ignored by those scholars who propose that regularity was paramount in urban design during the French mandate period; the *extra-muros* development of Trablusgarb is still attributed to Italian planners in recent studies of Italian colonial cities; and even the Hijaz Railroad was presented in an exhibition recently as a German project. These case studies will be explored in detail later.

45. *Servet-i Fünun,* no. 153 (1309/1894): 359–60; and no. 145 (1309/1894): 231. This should be situated in the context of the Ottoman culture of photography, the combined work of travel photographers, foreign and Ottoman commercial photographers (including regional ones), and Ottoman military photographers—as pointed out by Wolf-Dieter Lemke. Ottoman photography has recently been a popular topic of study. See, e.g., Wolf-Dieter Lemke, "Ottoman Photography: Recording and Contributing to Modernity," in Hanssen, Philipp, and Weber, *Empire in the City,* 237–44; and Engin Çizgen [Özendeş], *Photography in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1919* (Istanbul: Haşet Kitapevi, 1987).

46. For Moulin, see "La photographie en Algérie," *La lumière* 6, no. 12 (22 March 1856): 45. The Abdülhamid collection is housed in the Istanbul University Central Library (Istanbul Üniversitesi Merkez Kütüphanesi, IÜMK).

47. Gilbert Beaugé and Engin Çizgen and Suraiya Faroqhi also remarked on this difference. See Gilbert Beaugé and Engin Çizgen, *Images d'empire, aux origines de la photographie en Turquie, Türkiye'de Fotoğrafın Öncüleri* (Istanbul: Institut d'Études Françaises d'Istanbul, n.d.), 200–211; Suraiya Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 259.

48. Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, "Orientalism *alla turca*: Late 19th/Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim 'Outback,'" *Die Welt des Islams* 40, no. 2 (July 2000): 141–51.

49. Ahmet Şerif, *Anadolu'da Tanin,* ed. Mehmet Çetin Börekçi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 1:197.

50. Çelik, *Remaking of Istanbul,* 168n34.

51. IÜMK, album 90598.

52. Şerif, *Anadolu'da Tanin,* 2:257.

53. Another difficulty stemmed from the fact that I have not been to Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Hijaz. However, examining recent photographs and plans, I realize that the cities I discuss have lost much of their nineteenth-century development. Hence, I was restricted to cartographic and photographic reconstructions.

## 1 IMPERIAL INFRASTRUCTURES

1. Quoted in Narcisse Faucon, *La Tunisie avant et depuis l'occupation française* (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1893), 2:150.

2. Ibid., 138–39, 147.

3. Quoted in Mohamed Lazhar Gharbi, *Impérialisme et réformisme au Maghreb: Histoire d'un chemin de fer algéro-tunisien* (Tunis: Cérès, 1994), 139.

4. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 197; Faucon, *La Tunisie*, 2:151.

5. Gharbi supports this interpretation in detail in reference to the Bône–Guelma line. See Gharbi, *Impérialisme et réformisme au Maghreb.*

6. Faucon, *La Tunisie*, 2:191.

7. See Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 53, 56. Conklin examines the *mise-en-valeur* of the colonies in specific reference to West Africa.

8. This regulation, titled Yolların Umur-u Tesviyesi ve Ahalinin Suret-i İstihdamı Hakkında Talimatname (The Ordering Operations of Roads and the Conditions of Public Employment), also enforced public participation in the work. For example, men between the ages of 16 and 60 had to work a minimum of four hours per year or 20 days every five years in the construction of roads and bridges in the areas where they lived; monetary compensation could be substituted. These regulations were translated into Arabic in 1878. See Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 115.

9. Musa Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1900), 300; Stanford Shaw, "The Nineteenth Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (1975): 433.

10. Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 39.

11. Mehmed Refik and Mehmed Behçet, *Beyrut Vilayeti* (Beirut: Vilayet Matbaası, 1333/1917), 1:148–49.

12. This was a widely acknowledged fact, as illustrated by high school history textbooks: "The province has many more roads than other provinces." See Cevad İbn ün-Nüzhet, *Haritalı Musavver Memalik-i Osmaniye Coğrafyası* (Istanbul: Osmaniye Matbaası, 1327/1909), 109.

13. Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 113.

14. Refik and Behçet, *Beyrut Vilayeti*, 1:148; Şerafettin Mağmumi, *Seyahat Hatıraları* (Cairo, 1909), 288; *Salname-yi Vilayet-i Beyrut, 1311–1312* (Beirut: Vilayet Matbaası, 1315/1897), 25. On the completion of the Jaffa–Jerusalem road, which extended to Babü'l Vadi Boğazı, in 1864, see BOA, A.MKT.MHM 395/92 (1284); Kark, *Jaffa*, 220; and Yasemin Avcı, *Değişim Sürecinde bir Osmanlı Kenti: Kudüs (1890–1914)* (Ankara: Phoenix, 2004), 182–83. The Jaffa–Nablus road, completed in 1888, boasted a bridge with stone piers and an iron superstructure; its iron bars were imported from France. See Kark, *Jaffa*, 223.

15. Refik and Behçet, *Beyrut Vilayeti*, 1:65–66.

16. "10,000 kilomètres des Ponts et Chaussées," *Revue technique d'Orient* 1, no. 1 (15 September 1910): 1–2.

17. *Yemen Salnamesi* (Sana: Vilayet Matbaası, 1313/1895), 353.

18. Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid ve Saltanatı: Hayat-ı Hususiye ve Siyasiyesi* (Istanbul: Kütüphane-yi İslam ve Asker—İbrahim Hilmi, 1327/1909), 948.



19. Engin Deniz Akarlı, ed., *Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından Ali ve Fuad Paşaların Siyasi Vasiyetnameleri* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1978), 25.

20. [Sultan] Abdül Hamid, *Siyasi Hatıralarım*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975), 94.

21. *Salname-yi Vilayet-i Beyrut* (Beirut: Matbaa-yı Vilayet, 1324/1908–9), 55.

22. Murat Özyüksel, *Hicaz Demiryolu* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000), 9–11.

23. Michael E. Bonine, "The Introduction of Railroads in the Eastern Mediterranean: Economic and Social Impacts," in Philipp and Schaebler, *Syrian Land*, 59.

24. Özyüksel, *Hicaz Demiryolu*, 33; Avcı, *Değişim Sürecinde bir Osmanlı Kenti*, 188–90.

25. On the construction of the Berede Boğazı, Sofer, and Araya tunnels and the Zerzer viaduct, see *Servet-i Fünun*, no. 241 (1311/1893–94); Özyüksel, *Hicaz Demiryolu*, 32; Bonine, "Railroads in the Eastern Mediterranean," 59.

26. Bonine, "Railroads in the Eastern Mediterranean," 59; Refik and Behçet, *Beyrut Vilayeti*, 1:170–71.

27. Refik and Behçet, *Beyrut Vilayeti*, 1:171.

28. Özyüksel, *Hicaz Demiryolu*, 35.

29. Refik and Behçet, *Beyrut Vilayeti*, 1:169–70.

30. Özyüksel, *Hicaz Demirolu*, 42.

31. An article in *Le tour du monde* underlined the commercial advantages Germany would gain from this line and reported that Germans were in the process of "preparing the land for German colonization." It urgently called for French "participation in this gigantic work." See H. Hauser, "Le chemin de fer de Bagdad," *A travers du monde*, appendix to *Le tour du monde* 3, no. 3 (20 January 1900): 21–22.

32. Özyüksel, *Hicaz Demiryolu*, 22–24; Bonine, "Railroads in the Eastern Mediterranean," 57–58.

33. *Actes de la Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman de la Syrie, Akka à Damas* (Pera, Constantinople: Imprimerie du journal "Stamboul," 1891); IÜMK 79296, arts. 19, 22, 25, and 26 (Convention), and art. 16 (Cahier des charges), pp. 12–14, 24.

34. Literature on the Hijaz Railroad is extensive. Among the most insightful publications on the topic are two books offering new interpretations based on hitherto-untapped sources: Ufuk Gülsoy's *Hicaz Demiryolu* (Istanbul: Eren, 1994), which uses Ottoman archival documents, and Özyüksel's *Hicaz Demiryolu*, which relies primarily on German material. William Ochsenwald's *The Hijaz Railroad* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980) is a comprehensive study that stands out in its exhaustive use of French and English sources. Jacob M. Landau's *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1971) is the translation of a text in Arabic by Muhammed Arif and constitutes an important source. A recent exhibition, titled "Bagdadbahn und Hedjazbahn," was organized by Deutschebundesbahn Museum Nürnberg (28 September 2003–15 February 2004) and also shown in Pergamonmuseum in Berlin (8 October 2004–9 January 2005). Looking at railroad construction in the Ottoman Empire exclusively from the German point of view and using only German documents, this large exhibition covered the construction of the two lines up to the present day and complemented the historic documents with a series of photographs by Helmut Dollhopt, shot in 2000, along the two lines.

STUDIES IN MODERNITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY examine the relationships among modernity, the nation-state, and nationalism as these have evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Titles in this interdisciplinary and transregional series also illuminate how the nation-state is being undermined by the forces of globalization, international migration, and electronic information flows, as well as resurgent ethnic and religious affiliations. These books highlight historical parallels and continuities while documenting the social, cultural, and spatial expressions through which modern national identities have been constructed, contested, and reinvented.

*Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* by Sibel Bozdoğan

*Chandigarh's Le Corbusier: The Struggle for Modernity in Postcolonial India* by Vikramaditya Prakash

*Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics* by Jenny B. White

*The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space* edited by Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman

*Architecture and Tourism in Italian Colonial Libya: An Ambivalent Modernism* by Brian L. McLaren

*Everyday Modernity in China* edited by Madeleine Yue Dong and Joshua L. Goldstein

*Empire, Architecture, and the City: French-Ottoman Encounters, 1830–1914* by Zeynep Çelik

*Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century* edited by Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi

# *Empire, Architecture, and the City*

## FRENCH-OTTOMAN ENCOUNTERS, 1830–1914

ZEYNEP ÇELIK

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PRESS *Seattle & London*

Fine Arts
NA
9053
.56
C45
2008

This book is published with grants from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation; Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Turkish Republic; School of Architecture at the New Jersey Institute of Technology; and the University Seminars at Columbia University.

This book is also supported by the University of Washington Press Endowment in memory of Marsha L. Landolt (1948–2004), Dean of the Graduate School and Vice Provost, University of Washington.

© 2008 by the
University of Washington Press
Printed in Canada
Designed by Ashley Saleeba
12 11 10 09 08 5 4 3 2 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

University of Washington Press
PO Box 50096, Seattle, WA 98145
www.washington.edu/uwpress

The paper used in this publication is acid-free and 90 percent recycled from at least 50 percent post-consumer waste. It meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–1984.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Çelik, Zeynep.
Empire, architecture, and the city :
French-Ottoman encounters, 1830–1914 /
Zeynep Çelik.—
1st ed.
p. cm. — (Studies in modernity and national identity)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-295-98779-8 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Public spaces—Africa, North. 2. Public spaces—Turkey. 3. Architecture, French—Africa, North. 4. Architecture, Ottoman. 5. Architecture and state—Africa, North. 6. Architecture and state—Turkey. I. Title.
NA9053.S6C45 2008
720.956—dc22 2007053064

TO THE MEMORY OF MY PARENTS

# CONTENTS


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IX

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONS AND DATES XIII

INTRODUCTION 3

COLOR PLATES

**1** IMPERIAL INFRASTRUCTURES 24

**2** TRANSFORMING URBAN FABRICS 71

**3** NEW PUBLIC SPACES 116

**4** A NEW MONUMENTALITY AND AN OFFICIAL ARCHITECTURE 159

**5** AFFIRMING EMPIRE: PUBLIC CEREMONIES 216

EPILOGUE 246

NOTES 275

BIBLIOGRAPHY 309

INDEX 321